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Abstract 
 
Decentralization is a fairly recent process in Peru that has been driven by a mixture of 
democratization, state modernization, increased accountability in service delivery, and regional 
economic development objectives. Politics has also played an important role. Overall, the 
general approach to decentralization reform in Peru has been cautious and conservative and by 
design its implementation has been gradual. With hindsight there were several important 
missteps that could have been avoided. There are other important aspects that will require 
substantial reform efforts in the coming years, including the formation of macroregions and how 
to undo the important negative consequences of the canon system. Peru is today at a stage where 
the question is what final form of decentralization to adopt. This paperer provides a blueprint for 
achieving a more efficient and equitable decentralization system in the country. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Decentralization is a fairly recent process in Peru. It began in 2002 with an amendment to the 
Constitution declaring the decentralized nature of the Peruvian State, and with Legislative 
Decree No. 955, the Fiscal Decentralization Law. Although there had been previous attempts to 
decentralize,
1
 under the administration of President Toledo,
2
 the country plunged, without much 
national debate, into an accelerated timetable of legislation which, over the last decade, has 
produced an extensive legal framework covering most aspects of the system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. As a result, each tier of subnational government (regional and 
local) in the aggregate commanded about one-fifth of total public expenditures in 2009. 
 
The official political discourse for decentralization has not been different in Peru from that of 
other countries that have decentralized with a mixture of democratization, state modernization, 
increased accountability in service delivery, and regional economic development objectives.
3
 
However, since the 1970s, the objective of regional development, in particular, has been 
paramount in the several attempts to decentralize Peru and in the current process of the last 10 
years (see Rühling 2008). It reflects a national concern about the concentration of wealth and 
population around the Lima metropolitan area and the lack of development and often poverty on 
the periphery, which is most of the rest of the country. 
 
As has also happened in many other countries that have decentralized, the current process of 
decentralization in Peru got started as a reaction to political centralism, in its most recent 
incarnation in Peru at the hands of the Fujimori regime. Political economy interests and plain 
politics have been of paramount importance in the pace and depth of the decentralization process 
in Peru. In particular, the outcomes of municipal elections, which repeatedly turned out to be 
contrary to the plans of the elected president, have played an important role in pronounced policy 
shifts toward decentralization. The defeat of President Fujimori’s candidates in the municipal 
elections of January 1993 was a significant motivating factor in his draconian recentralization 
reforms, which turned into a lost decade for the decentralization process. Similar developments 
took place under Presidents Toledo (2002–06) and García (2007–11), with both chief executives 
being at first strong proponents of decentralization reforms, and then turning against the process 
after a failure of their parties in municipal elections.
4
  
 
Overall, the general approach to decentralization reform in Peru has been cautious and 
conservative, drawing important lessons from previous mistakes made in other Latin American 
                                                          
1
 Peru had previously embarked on decentralization reforms but never with lasting impacts. For the most part, the 
country was ruled from a centralist paradigm, and formal and less formal calls for decentralization were practically 
ignored. For example, the 1933 Constitution’s provision for elected local councils was ignored, except during 
President Belaunde’s two terms (1963–68 and 1980–85), but even then with little devolution of responsibilities (see 
Rühling 2008). 
2
 In a short period—2002 to 2004—11 major decentralization laws were passed. However, this was all done without 
the benefit of an overall strategy paper or “white paper” laying out the long-term vision for the decentralization 
process and being updated at each stage of the reform. 
3
 Several studies have analyzed different aspects of Peru’s decentralization process. See, for example, Aragón and 
Gayoso (2005), Ahmad and García-Escribano (2006 and 2011), Rühling (2008), and World Bank (2010). 
4
 See, for example, World Bank (2010) and Rühling (2008). 
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countries in the recent past (see Martinez-Vazquez
 
2010). From the very start, there was 
particular emphasis on avoiding runaway subnational borrowing and bailouts leading to 
macroeconomic instability. Also from the start, there was emphasis on avoiding the ballooning 
of public employment expenditures and duplication of services, which had happened in other 
Latin American countries by decentralizing first revenues in some form of revenue sharing 
without an explicit reassignment of expenditure responsibilities from the central agencies to 
decentralized governments. To a large extent, those goals have been accomplished in Peru. 
 
By design, the implementation of the decentralization program was intended to be gradual. This 
was especially the case in the devolution of responsibilities against a system of accredited 
capacity by subnational governments. The process was also to be gradual in the creation of a new 
layer of regional governments, or macroregions, as the result of the amalgamation of several 
departments—the existing intermediate level of (deconcentrated) government. On paper, the 
delivered graduated approach looked like a good strategy. In practice, however, implementation 
ran into significant problems with the sequencing and timing of the reforms. 
 
With the hindsight of the experience of the last decade, there were several important missteps 
that could have been avoided.  
 
First, the lack of administrative capacity of many subnational governments and the requirements 
of the accreditation process required heavy investing by the central authorities to create that 
capacity. However, the capacity-building programs failed to deliver or were never implemented 
and, not surprisingly, central government line ministries and agencies did not prove to be 
supportive of the decentralization process. This meant that by 2006 many of the expenditure 
responsibilities planned for decentralization had not been devolved. This led to President 
García’s “decentralization shock” policy in 2006, which was meant to accelerate the devolution 
of expenditure responsibilities, ready or not. Today, many local governments in Peru remain 
highly fragmented and with little capacity to collect revenues and implement efficient service 
delivery. 
 
Second, perhaps the most important miscalculation in the implementation sequence for 
decentralization was to delay the referendum for the creation of the macroregions to 2005, after 
having elected in 2002 regional (departmental) governors and introduced regional governments 
in each department. The regional governments received, in a first stage, transfers 
“corresponding” to the expenditure assignments already devolved, and, as an incentive for the 
amalgamation of departments, the plan was for the new macroregions to receive, on a derivation 
basis, 50 percent of the majority of the national taxes (including the corporate income tax 
[impuesto a la renta de tercera categoría], the personal income tax [impuesto a la renta de las 
personas naturales], and the value-added tax [impuesto general a las ventas]) collected in their 
territories. 
 
All this meant that the newly elected governors would need to sacrifice their tenure in office to 
achieve the amalgamation of several departments into a macroregion. Predictably, the new 
elected governors opposed the amalgamation. President Toledo’s lukewarm support appears to 
have contributed to the sound rejection of the referendum for the creation of the macroregions. 
Even though there were plans to hold a second referendum, these plans have been postponed 
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indefinitely. The result has been to leave the intermediate level of decentralized governance in 
Peru just half-built. Even though additional expenditure responsibilities have been transferred, as 
will be seen, much of what has been done can be considered part of a deconcentrated system 
with the still heavy influence of line ministries and other central agencies. On the revenue side, 
the planned 50 percent revenue sharing, of course, did not materialize. In addition, there were 
never plans and there are still no plans, to provide the regional governments with a minimum of 
revenue autonomy; regional governments remain completely financed by central transfers and 
revenue sharing from extractive industries.  
 
Third, the seeds for the most disruptive aspect of the decentralization system in Peru 
nowadays—the canon5—were planted in 1993 with the “mineral canon” and as early as 1973 
with the “oil canon” involving introduction of revenue sharing arrangements of rents from the 
exploitation of natural resources among the central government, local governments and, to a 
lesser extent, the intermediate level of government, the departments. This was long before the 
start of the current decentralization process in 2002, but the decentralization strategy did nothing 
to correct it at the time. However, in all fairness, the potential dangers associated with the canon 
were not that easy to detect before the upward spiral in the world prices of natural resources in 
the second half of the 2000s. 
 
One of the most serious consequences of the canon has been a virtual explosion in fiscal 
disparities across local and regional governments. Because the level and design of local and 
regional transfers have not been able to offset the highly uneven distribution of canon funds, the 
decentralization process in Peru is failing to deliver on one of its most cherished national goals 
for decentralization, with significant historical roots, of reducing regional economic disparities in 
the country.
6
 Another consequence of the canon has been to reduce the overall efficiency of 
public expenditures, again diminishing another stated goal of decentralization. With the 
enormous increases in fiscal resources, the subnational governments’ recipients of canon funds 
have been under heavy pressure from the central authorities and civil stakeholders to disburse 
those funds. Because the canon funds are earmarked for capital infrastructure projects, this has 
made it even more difficult for subnational authorities to spend the funds in a timely and efficient 
manner.
7
 So far, it has been politically infeasible to even consider a direct reform of the canon 
system because of the extremely strong opposition of the local and regional governments that 
now benefit from the system. Finding a solution to this issue remains the greatest challenge to 
Peru’s decentralization process.  
 
There are still other important aspects of the decentralization process that remain problematic 
and that will require substantial reform efforts in the coming years. For example, expenditure 
assignments still lack clarity, and subnational governments at all levels are highly dependent on 
central government transfers. This deprives Peru’s decentralization system of adequate levels of 
accountability and fiscal responsibility. The systems of transfers are also in need of a serious 
                                                          
5
 The canon, sobrecanon, and royalties are the major natural resource sources of transfer, discussed in detail later in 
the chapter. We will follow the convention of abbreviating all those sources under the name of canon. 
6
 However, at one level, the canon has distributed wealth to some, just a few, areas on the periphery of the country 
away from the Lima region. 
7
 In particular, see the World Bank (2010) for an extensive discussion of this point. 
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overhaul, in part to address the acute interjurisdictional fiscal inequalities arising from the canon 
system. 
 
 
2. Territorial Vertical Structure of Government  
 
Current vertical structure and political organization  
 
The vertical structuring of decentralized government is an unfinished project in Peru. This is true 
at the regional level, with the failure to constitute the macroregions, and at the local level, due to 
the high level of municipal fragmentation. The macroregions issue continues to hold hostage the 
advancement of the other aspects of decentralization in the country. It is quite urgent, therefore, 
that the territorial structure of government be addressed on a more permanent basis   
 
The territorial composition of Peru includes, at the intermediate level, 24 regions (or 
departments) plus the Constitutional Province of Callao; and at the local level, 1,834 
municipalities, of which 195 are provincial municipalities and the rest district municipalities.
8
 
All regional and local governments approve their own budgets. The dual coexistence at the same 
local level of provincial and district municipalities is a peculiarity of Peru’s vertical government 
structure. The basic statistics for jurisdiction size by population and area for regional and local 
governments are presented in table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Jurisdiction Size by Level of Government 
 Number Population Area (km
2
) 
  Maximum Minimum Median Maximum Minimum Median 
Regional  
Governments: 
       
Departments 25 1,630,772 92,024 669,973 368,852 4,657 35,903 
Municipal  
(local) governments: 
      
Provinces 195 861,746 3,415 56,497 119,859 264 3,207 
Districts 1,638 276,921 108 4,402 34,943 2 235 
Source: PRODES 2007. 
Note: km
2
 = square kilometers. 
 
Regional governments vary significantly in area size, from 370,000 square kilometers for Loreto 
to 4,657 for Tumbes, with the median at approximately 36,000 square kilometers (see table 5.1). 
With the exception of the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima, the differences in population size 
are less pronounced, but nevertheless are still quite large. There are also wide variations in the 
population and area of municipal governments (table 5.1). The governance structure in the area 
                                                          
8
 Provincial municipalities have the same expenditure responsiblities as district municipalities but, in addition, 
provincial municipalities have several other service responsibilities that extend to the district municipalities within 
the provincial boundaries. However, district municipalities do not depend hierarchically on the provincial 
municipalities (as mandated by the Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Municipales). The provincial municipalities are also 
responsible for the provision of services in a large number of villages (centros poblados). 
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of Lima is complex due to the fact that there are overlapping jurisdictions of different levels (see 
box 5.1). 
 
Box 5.1 Government Structure of Lima and its Demographic and Economic Significance  
 
In the Lima area there are a number of overlapping government units that have the same name—Lima—which 
makes things a bit confusing. It helps to recall that the administrative structure of Peru contains regions (or 
departments), provincial municipalities, and district municipalities. Each region or department is typically composed 
of several provincial municipalities. A provincial municipality has authority over its respective territory and also the 
“center” district municipality in the province. In other words, the mayor of a provincial municipality is also the 
mayor of the center district. 
 
In the province of Lima, the provincial municipality (also called Metropolitan Municipality of Lima [MML]) has its 
“center” in the Lima district. 
 
In the region (department) of Lima, the regional government does not have authority over the province of Lima. The 
election of regional authorities in the region of Lima does not include the province of Lima, but rather only the other 
nine remaining provinces of the Lima region. The regional seat or capital city of the Lima region is Huacho. 
 
In effect, the provincial municipality of Lima (MML) has a special regime that combines district, provincial, and 
regional competences. The Lima district (Cercado de Lima) is run directly by the MML, since it is the center 
district. The Lima Metropolitan Council exercises powers and functions equivalent to the Regional Council, and the 
mayor of the MML exercises the powers and functions equivalent to the Regional President. As part of its provincial 
competences, the MML has responsibilities over the 43 districts that are part of the province of Lima. Also, as part 
of its district responsibilities, the MML is in charge of collecting the property taxes in the Lima district. 
 
Finally, the denomination “Metropolitan Lima” refers to the geographic area that includes the 43 districts of Lima 
Province and the six districts of the Constitutional Province of Callao. Metropolitan Lima has a significant presence 
in the population and the economy of Peru. With about 0.2 percent of the land area of the country, Metropolitan 
Lima represents over 40 percent of Peru’s GDP and about one-third of its total population.  
 
The most important issue in the organizational structure of municipal governments is the high 
level of fragmentation. Table 5.2 provides an overview of the level of municipal fragmentation in 
Peru. More than half of the municipalities have populations under 5,000, and just under 11 
percent (200 municipalities) have populations under 1,000. To give some perspective, Peru has a 
higher level of municipal fragmentation than, for example, its neighbors Bolivia and Ecuador. 
With an average population of 15,000, the average municipality in Peru is about half the size of 
the average municipality in Bolivia and one-third the size of the average municipality in 
Ecuador. Internationally, only a few highly fragmented countries, like France and Spain, have 
smaller average municipal sizes. 
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Table 5.2 Population Distribution at the Municipal Level 
Population 
Districts Provinces 
Number Percent Number Percent 
0–1,000 201 11.0 0 0.0 
1,000–5,000 777 42.4 1 0.5 
5,000–10,000 368 20.1 8 4.1 
10,000–50,000 377 20.6 67 34.4 
>50,000 110 6.0 119 61.0 
Total 1,833 100.0 195 100.0 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 2005 Census.  
 
The level of local fragmentation varies significantly by region. Amazonas, Apurímac, and 
Huancavelica, with a municipal average of 5,000 inhabitants, stand at one-third of the national 
average, and actually 18 of the 25 regions or departments (72 percent) do not reach the national 
average of 15,000 inhabitants. The high concentration of population in Callao and Lima explains 
the higher municipal average; in Callao the average population of municipalities is over 120,000 
(table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.3 Average Size of Municipalities by Department 
Departments  Average Population Average Area (km
2
) 
Amazonas 4,497 436 
Ancash 5,804 193 
Apurímac 5,000 240 
Arequipa 10,126 541 
Ayacucho 5,272 359 
Cajamarca 10,081 238 
Callao 120,257 21 
Cusco 10,055 595 
Huancavelica 4,597 219 
Huánuco 8,724 424 
Ica 14,401 444 
Junín 9,039 285 
La Libertad 16,833 268 
Lambayeque 27,648 347 
Lima 44,619 191 
Loreto 15,831 6,360 
Madre de Dios 6,826 6,093 
Moquegua 7,193 684 
Pasco 8,937 817 
8 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
Piura 23,522 499 
Puno 10,602 549 
San Martín 7,998 589 
Tacna 9,196 519 
Tumbes 12,444 253 
Ucayali 23,220 5,657 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, Censo 2005. 
Note: km
2
 = square kilometers. 
 
Politically, Peru is a unitary unicameral state, with a Congress composed of 120 members whose 
election coincides with the presidential election every five years.
9
 Regional and local elections 
are held every four years, and provincial municipality governments elect at least one 
representative to the regional legislature.
10
 Although municipal elections have been held on and 
off for many years, regional elections have been held since 2002. 
 
From the viewpoint of political coordination, the Assembly of Regional Governments, which has 
a rotating presidency, has become an important element in the decentralized institutional system 
of Peru, in active dialogue with the President of the Republic. 
 
Main challenges and issues with the vertical administrative structure  
 
The three main challenges in the current vertical government structure are: 
 
 A high level of municipal fragmentation 
 The difficult consolidation of the regional (or departmental) governments into 
macroregional governments 
 Lack of clear boundary demarcations at the local and regional levels.  
 
(i) The high level of municipal fragmentation represents a source of inefficiencies in the 
delivery of public services when economies of scale are not sufficiently exploited. However, to 
some extent, this cost may be offset by the higher levels of political representation and 
presumably more accountability associated with the current smaller local governments and the 
potentially higher transaction costs associated with large jurisdictions.
11
  
 
From the start of the decentralization process in 2002, there has been considerable effort to 
achieve some degree of consolidation among small municipal governments. In a first line of 
activity, through the enactment of the Municipal Amalgamation Law of 2007 (Ley de Fusión de 
Municipios), special fiscal incentives have been offered for the consolidation of municipalities 
with a joint population of at least 8,000 inhabitants in the case of two district municipalities and 
                                                          
9
 Among the Congessional representatives, 25 are elected representing each of the regions, and the rest are elected 
by electoral districts on the basis of population. 
10
 In the case of Callao, each district municipality elects a regional representative. 
11
 Although, typically, the benefits of jurisdictional amalgamation are taken for granted, there is not much significant 
empirical evidence on the size of those benefits (Carr 2004; Dollery and Robotti 2008). 
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12,000 inhabitants in the case of three district municipalities.
12
 The fiscal incentive consists of a 
premium of 50 percent of the Municipal Compensation Fund (FONCOMUN) transfers (the most 
important transfer from the central to local governments, discussed below) over the amount that 
would be received by the nonamalgamated municipalities over 15 years.
13
 However, to date there 
have been no takers. Reasons given for this include the lack of information among municipal 
authorities, the more recently approved regulations to the law, or simply the lack of salience of 
the fiscal incentives offered, especially to those municipalities flush with funds from the canon. 
In addition, no doubt political incentives have also played a role; mayors are naturally reluctant 
to lose their jobs in the process. Constituencies may have also been reluctant to support the 
amalgamation because of perceived losses in representation. 
 
In a second line of activity, Peru introduced the Local Government Association Law (Ley de 
Mancomunidades) in 2007, which regulates the voluntary association of district municipalities 
for service delivery and infrastructure projects. This law also regulates the delegation of 
expenditure responsibilities to other municipalities or upper-level government agencies. This 
newer initiative is still to be fully tested, but it promises to offer a solution to the fragmentation 
problem.  
 
(ii) From the start of the decentralization process in 2002, there has also been considerable 
effort made, but also errors, to consolide departments or regions into macroregions. In fact, the 
territorial reorganization of Peru into macroregions early became one of the fundamental design 
pieces of decentralization reform. However, the regional referendums held in 2005 to gain 
popular approval for the consolidation of the existing departments into macroregions were 
overwhelmingly negative, with the result that the previous regional and departmental structure 
remained completely unchanged. Therefore, the decentralization process at the regional level has 
continued on the basis of the existing departments but at a much slower speed. The Law on the 
Foundations of Decentralization (Ley de Bases de la Descentralización) anticipated that, if the 
2005 referendums were to be negative, new referendums would be called in 2009 and 2011. 
Those new referendums, however, were never called, and any new referendums have been 
delayed indefinitely. 
 
The Law on the Foundations of Decentralization defines the macroregions as territorial 
sustainable units with historical, administrative, economic, cultural, and environmental links, but 
does not offer a clear rationale or explicit objectives for the consolidation of deparments into 
macroregions. Supposedly, the main argument for the macroregions was one of efficiency in 
administration and better coordinated policies vis-à-vis the more fragmented departments (or 
current regions). It was left to the Law on Incentives for the Integration and Conformation of 
Regions (Ley de Incentivos para la Integración y Conformación de Regiones) to provide explicit 
                                                          
12
 The 8,000 and 12,000 inhabitants correspond to the minimum population bases required for the creation of new 
municipal districts by the Law of Territorial Demarcation. These population sizes may be adequate to attain 
economies of scale for some local public services, but not for others requiring large amounts of infrastructure.  
13
 Those funds, however, would need to be spent only on infrastructure.  
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fiscal incentives for the integration and the creation of Committees of Interregional Coordination 
as the vehicles for managing the consolidation of departments.
14
 
 
The fiscal incentives to regional consolidation included additional sources of financing, easier 
access to credit, and tax advantages for enterprises located in the new region for contracts with 
the central government. The most important advantage offered was the 50 percent tax sharing for 
the new regions allocated by formula in three major national taxes: the value-added tax,
15
 the 
personal income tax, and excise taxes (impuesto delectivo al consumo). However, the apparent 
generosity of these incentives was considerably diminished once it was made clear that this 
funding had to cover the costs of the services already being offered by the central government 
agencies in the constituent departments (existing regions). The 50 percent sharing would come as 
a substitution for the existing direct central government transfers that were covering the costs of 
those services. 
 
Fiscal incentives or not, however, the referendums for integration were soundly defeated. 
Besides the potential weakness of the fiscal incentives, there were other powerful reasons behind 
the defeat. Most important were the negative political incentives for the existing department 
heads who would have lost their office and jobs had the referendums passed (World Bank 2010). 
President Toledo is also reported to have supported the referendums only lukewarmly (Rühling 
2008). 
 
Because of the extremely low prospects at the present time of holding successful referendums for 
the integration of the new macroregions, in practice, the process of fiscal decentralization reform 
has gone on but, nevertheless, clearly burdened at the regional level by the failure to reach that 
critical stage envisioned in the original decentralization strategy. As we will see in this chapter, 
there has been more progress on the side of transferring responsibilities to the departments and 
regions but little progress on the revenue side, with no tax assignments and just an increase in 
transfers for capital purposes.  
 
(iii) The demarcation of boundaries remains an unresolved issue at the local level. The 
National Directorate of Territorial Demarcation, as reported in World Bank (2010), indicates that 
about 80 percent of district municipalities and 92 percent of provincial municipalities still have 
no permanently defined boundaries. This has the potential of becoming a source of conflict, 
especially among local governments located in natural resource deposits. 
 
 
                                                          
14
 The Law on Incentives required that proposals for macroregions must be based on a technical study documenting 
the viability of the new region in terms of a number of criteria including integration of roads and communications, 
economic competitiveness and socialization, and presence of universities. See Friz Burga (2008) for further 
discussion of this legislation. 
15
 Excluding the Impuesto de Promoción Municipal, whose revenues are earmarked to the FONCOMUN transfer. 
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3. Expenditure Patterns and the Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities 
 
Decentralized expenditure patterns 
 
The most visible impact of the fiscal decentralization process in Peru is in the rise of subnational 
expenditures as a share of total expenditures. While regional expenditures have declined slightly, 
municipal expenditures have been expanding (largely related, as we see below, to the increase in 
funding from the canon transfer from natural resources) and have come to represent around 40 
percent of total capital expenditures and over 13 percent of total current expenditures (table 5.4). 
The lack of increase in regional expenditures is related to the lack of devolution of additional 
responsibilities that were planned with the (eventual) introduction of the macroregions.  
 
Subnational governments (regional and local governments combined) represented about 35 
percent of current total expenditures during 2005–10. From an international perspective, this puts 
Peru at an intermediate level of decentralization, especially if we consider, as discussed later, 
that a considerable share of regional government expenditures are not really decentralized but 
rather deconcentrated expenditures.  
 
It is notable that during 2005–10, the combined share of regional and local governments in total 
capital expenditure in Peru was, on average, over half of all capital expenditure, with about 27 
percent corresponding to local governments and about 24 percent to regional governments.
16
 
Clearly related to the increases in revenues from the canon, the share of local governments in 
capital expenditure reached 37 percent in 2010. With an additional 24 percent of capital 
expenditures spent by regional governments in 2010, Peru is among those countries with highly 
decentralized public capital expenditures (table 5.4).     
 
It is also notable that during 2005–10, the combined share of regional and local governments in 
total capital expenditure in Peru was, on average, over half of all capital expenditure. Clearly 
related to the increases in revenues from the canon, the share of local governments in capital 
expenditure reached 37 percent in 2010 while the share of regional governments was 24 percent 
(table 5.4). 
 
                                                          
16
 Capital expenditures are defined as those for long-lived assets or those convertible into long-lived assets such as 
feasibility studies. 
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Table 5.4 Shares in Total Expenditures by Level of Government (in percent) 
 
 
Source: Prepared using data from the Economic Transparency Portal, MEF. 
Note: n.a. = not applicable. 
 
Note that in 2010, subnational governments represented only 4 percent of debt service 
expenditures (table 5.4); this reflects the current limitations on subnational borrowing. However, 
these official debt figures do not account for the so-called “floating debt” (“deuda flotante”), 
which includes arrears to providers and other short-term debt for which there is currently no 
detailed information. These and other debt issues are discussed further below. 
 
The evolution of the shares in total expenditures for the three levels in table 5.4 tells a clear story 
of decentralization in Peru over the last five years. The local governments’ share increased 40 
percent, mostly at the cost of a 25.8 percent decrease in the central government’s share and a 3.8 
percent decrease in the regional government’s share. 
 
  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Avg. 
2005–10 
% 
change 
2005–10 
Capital Expenditures       
      Central Government  75 72 40 34 32 40 49 -47.4 
    Regional Governments 25 28 26 22 23 23 24 -5.9 
    Local Governments n.a. n.a. 34 45 45 37 40 10.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  
         
Current Expenditures 
            Central Government 74 75 66 67 66 66 69 -10.5 
    Regional Governments 26 25 23 20 20 19 22 -26.0 
   Local Governments n.a. n.a. 11 13 14 15 13 31.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  
         
Debt service  
            Central Government 100 100 98 98 96 96 98 -4.3 
    Regional Governments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.0 
    Local Governments n.a. n.a. 2 2 4 4 3 181.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  
         Total Expenditures 
            Central Government 81 79 65 60 57 60 67 -25.8 
    Regional Governments 19 21 20 18 19 19 19 -3.8 
    Local Governments n.a. n.a. 15 22 24 21 21 40.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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The functional composition of expenditures at the regional level (table 5.5) shows the relative 
importance of education in the budget, which was about 36 percent in 2010, down from 52 
percent in 2005. This reflects the additional expenditure assignments to regional governments 
and the increase in importance of other responsibilities such as capital expenditures on 
infrastructure financed by regional canon funds. Still, the social sectors (education, health, and 
social assistance) represented about 70 percent of total regional expenditures in 2010.  
 
The most pronounced increases in public expenditures have been, as one would expect, in those 
regions most directly benefiting from the canon transfers, such as Ancash, Cajamarca, La 
Libertad, and Cusco (table 5.6). Lima has also experienced growth due to the greater availability 
of own revenues. However, the relatively low recorded expenditure for Lima is due to the lack of 
transfer of expenditure responsibility in key areas, such as health. In addition, the metropolitan 
area of Lima benefits directly from expenditures undertaken by the central government 
considerably more than other regions, and those expenditures do not show in Lima’s budget. 
Thus, for comparison purposes, it is important to pay close attention to these issues. 
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Table 5.5 Functional Composition of Expenditures at the Regional Level (in nuevos soles and percent) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Justice — 2,634,898 929,781 6,634,075 9,443,638 5,283,296 — 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Administration 416,843,555 456,259,161 521,896,013 874,208,668 1,058,427,879 1,008,790,573 4.3 4.0 3.7 5.3 5.7 5.1 
Agriculture 396,756,709 618,274,007 966,450,901 1,064,260,668 1,322,854,503 1,165,486,543 4.1 5.4 6.8 6.5 7.1 5.8 
Social Services 1,454,589,079 1,439,777,491 1,531,957,257 1,527,748,068 1,609,844,703 1,622,169,430 15.0 12.6 10.8 9.3 8.6 8.1 
Comunications 962,260 1,336,058 986,758 5,737,184 10,283,480 6,782,794 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Defense 5,127,150 37,373,609 108,382,214 125,522,149 149,522,446 229,359,087 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.2 
Education 5,001,393,479 5,521,089,935 6,192,925,180 6,717,620,232 7,128,330,085 7,232,879,058 51.6 48.3 43.7 41.1 38.2 36.3 
Energy 76,265,978 184,051,565 355,931,360 300,040,636 225,942,899 286,981,004 0.8 1.6 2.5 1.8 1.2 1.4 
Commerce 47,962,761 73,501,344 88,912,185 97,715,298 117,221,403 88,727,969 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 
Fishing 32,553,587 39,915,615 46,879,842 114,799,384 65,549,124 54,162,640 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.3 
External Affairs — 199,000 —              99,600             926,740               33,417  — 0.0 — 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Health 1,655,895,118 2,199,567,210 2,662,429,567 3,239,635,026 3,857,418,072 5,189,127,710 17.1 19.2 18.8 19.8 20.6 26.0 
Labor Relations 18,366,244 19,511,450 21,410,665 24,785,886 29,702,395 30,861,750 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Transport 549,805,423 772,434,393 1,606,582,709 2,227,215,181 2,951,392,307 2,848,396,032 5.7 6.8 11.3 13.6 15.8 14.3 
Housing 44,371,277 69,073,584 52,708,901 28,949,693 46,143,773 43,694,398 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Environment — — — — 98,821,066 113,802,158 — — — — 0.5 0.6 
Total 9,700,892,620 11,434,999,320 14,158,383,333 16,354,971,748 18,681,824,513 19,926,537,859 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Economic Transparency Portal, MEF.  
Note: — = not available.  
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Table 5.6 Expenditures by Regional Government (in nuevos soles and percents) 
Region 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Amazonas 188,348,645 222,008,351 305,467,566 357,468,973 380,236,068 417,986,003 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 
Ancash 540,071,926 686,850,659 1,146,935,801 1,580,787,240 2,173,502,254 2,110,024,052 5.6 6.0 8.1 9.7 11.6 10.6 
Apurimac 244,334,894 271,893,594 325,705,296 397,941,319 448,633,438 658,202,985 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 3.3 
Arequipa 578,965,737 671,113,829 773,859,407 899,118,730 1,042,506,440 1,055,360,058 6.0 5.9 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.3 
Ayacucho 353,008,938 426,028,523 513,061,587 534,002,797 598,927,492 720,851,208 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.6 
Cajamarca 649,748,595 780,752,061 967,332,189 964,615,095 1,046,912,953 1,290,529,582 6.7 6.8 6.1 5.9 5.6 6.5 
Callao 357,764,968 398,340,647 445,291,758 489,340,860 723,735,588 684,544,489 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.9 3.4 
Cusco 557,123,891 732,487,674 967,903,066 1,073,197,926 1,171,297,081 1,153,070,875 5.7 6.4 6.8 6.6 6.3 5.8 
Huancavelica 276,389,857 310,557,225 419,217,928 480,822,112 486,951,266 602,282,208 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.6 3.0 
Huánuco 292,414,155 321,063,975 373,164,598 437,529,412 451,836,082 604,776,560 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.4 3.0 
Ica 374,366,746 411,136,799 451,692,212 496,516,003 533,525,021 568,285,328 3.9 3.6 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9 
Junín 588,854,985 667,288,830 772,286,859 822,294,102 861,334,996 845,402,556 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.0 4.6 4.2 
La Libertad 647,396,792 690,771,056 823,043,107 965,426,112 1,036,726,276 1,165,028,246 6.7 6.0 5.8 5.9 5.5 5.8 
Lambayeque 388,922,437 534,611,751 486,746,640 535,603,903 560,428,707 680,325,582 4.0 4.7 4.1 3.3 3.0 3.4 
Lima 317,767,269 363,626,964 516,267,494 751,313,313 926,937,364 1,080,862,232 3.3 3.2 3.2 4.6 5.0 5.4 
Loreto 606,269,381 677,482,167 741,921,163 810,765,274 840,360,322 1,047,209,315 6.3 5.9 5.2 5.0 4.5 5.3 
Madre de Dios 76,302,219 85,716,962 131,108,384 188,225,059 277,122,399 282,414,810 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.4 
Moquegua 180,742,571 275,004,592 371,115,444 441,761,749 450,176,034 415,620,999 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.1 
Pasco 167,304,727 191,797,511 341,562,047 460,307,834 464,055,574 370,754,716 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.8 2.5 1.9 
Piura 637,667,639 756,266,823 851,766,133 872,428,830 1,080,405,075 1,128,917,373 6.6 6.6 6.0 5.3 5.8 5.7 
Puno 589,998,320 669,737,595 769,622,625 832,498,705 976,388,546 1,041,428,502 6.1 5.9 5.4 5.1 5.2 5.2 
San Martín 376,734,991 444,021,437 629,791,148 626,976,624 610,568,719 641,397,562 3.9 3.9 4.5 3.8 3.3 3.2 
Tacna 245,465,130 318,655,285 426,114,050 613,725,019 726,760,685 534,556,206 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.8 3.9 2.7 
Tumbes 173,658,093 208,337,742 239,907,280 249,803,709 295,283,660 375,334,595 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.9 
Ucayali 277,829,748 300,451,877 367,499,551 472,501,048 517,212,473 451,371,817 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.3 
Munic.  Met. de Lima 13,439,966 18,995,391 66,709,158 78,320,495 187,347,007 332,466,287 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.7 
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Totals 9,700,892,620 11,434,999,320 14,158,383,333 16,354,971,748 18,681,824,513 19,926,537,859 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Max 649,748,595 780,752,061 1,146,935,801 1,580,787,240 2,173,502,254 2,110,024,052 6.7 6.8 8.1 9.7 11.6 10.6 
Min 13,439,966 18,995,391 66,709,158 78,320,495 187,347,007 282,414,810 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.4 
Coef. of Variationa 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.52 
Source: Economic Transparency Portal, MEF. 
Note: a. The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the distribution. 
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There are significant disparities among the regions in per capita expenditures. The regions of 
Madre de Dios and Moquegua lead the ranking with 2,578 and 2,573 soles, respectively, for 
2010, with Lambayeque at the bottom end at 611 nuevos soles in 2010, less than one-fourth of 
those in Moquegua and Madre de Dios (table 5.7). While per capita expenditures for these two 
regions more than doubled during a five-year period, other regions such as Ancash and 
Apurimac have seen larger increases. The coefficient of variation increased through 2009 and 
decreased the last year for which data were available.  
 
   Table 5.7 Per Capita Regional Expenditures (in nuevos soles) 
Region 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Amazonas 501 590 812 951 1,011 1,112 
Ancash 508 646 1,078 1,486 2,044 1,984 
Apurímac 605 673 806 985 1110 1,628 
Arequipa 502 582 672 780 905 916 
Ayacucho 576 696 838 872 978 1177 
Cajamarca 468 563 627 695 754 930 
Callao 408 454 508 558 825 781 
Cusco 476 625 826 916 1,000 984 
Huancavelica 608 683 912 1,057 1,071 1,324 
Huánuco 384 421 490 574 593 793 
Ica 526 577 641 697 749 798 
Junín 478 541 627 667 699 686 
La Libertad 400 427 509 597 641 720 
Lambayeque 349 480 525 481 504 611 
Loreto 680 760 832 909 942 1,174 
Madre de Dios 696 782 1,197 1,718 2,530 2,578 
Moquegua 1,119 1,702 2,297 2,735 2,787 2,573 
Pasco 597 684 1,218 1,641 1,655 1,322 
Piura 380 451 508 520 645 673 
Puno 465 528 607 656 770 821 
San Martín 517 609 864 860 838 880 
Tacna 850 1,103 1,476 2,125 2,517 1,851 
Tumbes 867 1,040 1,198 1,247 1,474 1,874 
Ucayali 643 695 850 1,093 1,197 1,044 
Totales 354 417 516 596 681 727 
Max 1,119 1,702 2,297 2,735 2,787 2,578 
Min 349 421 490 481 504 611 
Coef. of Variation
a
 0.32 0.40 0.46 0.53 0.56 0.47 
                       Source: Economic Transparency Portal, MEF. 
 Note: a. The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the distribution. 
 
The functional composition of expenditures at the local level (table 5.8) shows that the relative 
importance of education, health, and social services combined represented 30 percent of total 
expenditures in 2010, followed by “administration” (25.7 percent) and transport and 
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communications (20.6 percent). While education and social services expenditures have declined 
somewhat in relative importance, health services expenditures have increased. The most 
pronounced public expenditure increases have been in the municipalities of those regions directly 
benefiting from the canon transfers, such as Ancash, Arequipa, and Cusco (table 5.9).  In 
addition, Lima has also experienced a significant increase in public expenditures, but unrelated 
to the canon transfers and, rather, based on a strong own tax base and central government 
transfer funds. 
 
Table 5.8 Functional Composition of Expenditures at the Local Level (in nuevos soles and 
percentages) 
Function 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Administration 3,040,345,733 4,989,005,195 5,603,866,393 5,880,627,313 27.3 25.1 23.6 25.7 
Public Security — — 527,743,781 545,556,275 — — 2.2 2.4 
Commerce 334,013,043 567,421,509 686,686,453 545,838,402 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.4 
Agriculture 439,455,937 1,169,533,390 1,453,203,063 1,325,254,280 3.9 5.9 6.1 5.8 
Fishing 11,775,707 44,259,564 45,955,558 27,682,505 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Energy 202,169,602 379,608,872 411,971,315 316,440,563 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.4 
Transport & 
Communications 
2,686,776,967 4,547,765,020 5,178,380,836 4,723,583,582 24.1 22.9 21.8 20.6 
Environmental Prot. — — 1,745,132,574 1,711,157,806 — — 7.4 7.5 
Housing 347,031,151 647,904,350 697,077,768 536,869,313 3.1 3.3 2.9 2.3 
Health 1,935,233,075 3,277,128,012 2,860,778,684 2,838,586,296 17.4 16.5 12.1 12.4 
Education & Culture 847,816,285 2,206,432,067 2,892,815,873 2,702,741,766 7.6 11.1 12.2 11.8 
Social Services 1,283,674,591 2,044,404,347 1,327,693,385 1,264,352,974 11.5 10.3 5.6 5.5 
Debt service — — 304,769,446 468,663,751 — — 1.3 2.0 
Total 11,128,292,091 19,873,462,326 23,736,075,129 22,887,354,826 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Economic Transparency Portal, MEF. 
Note: — = not available. 
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Table 5.9 Local Government Expenditures Aggregated by Region (in million soles and percentages) 
Region 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Amazonas 49,731,629 166,732,926 230,596,638 188,785,035 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.8 
Ancash 702,804,982 2,328,097,085 2,602,575,696 2,038,526,423 6.3 11.7 10.9 8.8 
Apurimac 85,901,048 228,299,245 322,020,541 303,887,206 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 
Arequipa 382,941,585 931,077,389 1,320,117,719 1,307,201,222 3.4 4.7 5.5 5.6 
Ayacucho 205,354,792 400,397,126 541,192,840 552,212,691 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.4 
Cajamarca 544,659,117 906,107,987 949,835,732 1,287,935,591 4.9 4.5 4.0 5.5 
Callao 347,738,151 434,840,762 476,404,104 464,382,348 3.1 2.2 2.0 2.0 
Cusco 826,536,424 1,693,685,791 1,877,428,801 1,917,426,819 7.4 8.5 7.8 8.3 
Huancavelica 105,907,212 427,362,070 535,926,632 551,050,128 0.9 2.1 2.2 2.4 
Huanuco 131,912,620 305,318,256 433,365,391 430,768,959 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.9 
Ica 220,354,832 393,224,585 539,863,957 613,124,322 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.6 
Junin 356,953,441 753,335,915 897,235,582 816,757,610 3.2 3.8 3.8 3.5 
La Libertad 365,200,282 791,460,008 1,047,101,683 1,240,453,807 3.3 4.0 4.4 5.3 
Lambayeque 183,805,933 343,554,011 505,721,330 531,008,102 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.3 
Lima 3,113,393,717 4,003,179,471 4,770,153,752 5,016,687,082 27.8 20.1 19.9 21.6 
Loreto 360,313,189 465,980,293 518,333,973 445,580,937 3.2 2.3 2.2 1.9 
Madre de Dios 16,075,818 41,336,427 59,183,875 64,479,675 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Moquegua 665,915,993 782,182,677 743,799,552 670,215,858 5.9 3.9 3.1 2.9 
Pasco 229,945,130 700,825,059 813,488,838 470,172,783 2.1 3.5 3.4 2.0 
Piura 574,450,526 915,277,178 1,117,431,205 1,041,478,232 5.1 4.6 4.7 4.5 
Puno 248,332,171 739,156,976 1,015,934,934 939,668,513 2.2 3.7 4.2 4.0 
San Martín 157,940,662 210,431,131 292,810,945 319,592,651 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.4 
Tacna 1,004,663,593 1,425,253,777 1,567,336,740 1,087,966,790 9.0 7.1 6.6 4.7 
Tumbes 90,583,537 190,668,711 208,643,174 195,504,135 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 
Ucayali 156,875,707 295,677,470 349,571,495 392,487,907 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 
Total 11,128,292,091 19,873,462,326 23,736,075,129 22,887,354,826 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Min 16,075,818 41,336,427 59,183,875 64,479,675 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Max 3,113,393,717 4,003,179,471 4,770,153,752 5,016,687,082 27.8 20.1 19.9 21.6 
Average 445,131,684 794,938,493 949,443,005 915,494,193 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 
Coeff. of 
Variationa 0.73 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.73 0.94 0.96 0.92 
Source: Economic Transparency Portal, MEF. 
Note: a. The ratio of standard deviation to the mean of the distribution. 
 
There are significant disparities in per capita expenditures among municipalities aggregated by 
region (table 5.10). After Lima with 5,976 nuevos soles in 2010, the municipalities in the regions 
of Moquegua and Tacna lead the ranking with 4,149 and 3,767 nuevos soles, respectively, for 
2010, with municipalities in San Martín and Lambayeque at the bottom end at 439 and 477 
nuevos soles, respectively, in 2010. This means that the average muncipal resident in San Martín 
has just about 10 percent of the expenditure per capita of municipal residents in Moquegua. Also, 
these disparities have been getting worse, with the coefficient of variation increasing by over 50 
percent from 2007 through 2010. 
 
20 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
Table 5.10 Per Capita Local Government Expenditures  
Aggregated by Region (in nuevos soles) 
Region 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Amazonas 132 443 613 502 
Ancash 661 2,189 2,447 1,917 
Apurimac 213 565 797 752 
Arequipa 332 808 1,146 1,134 
Ayacucho 335 654 884 902 
Cajamarca 392 653 684 928 
Callao 397 496 543 530 
Cusco 706 1,446 1,603 1,637 
Huancavelica 233 940 1,178 1,212 
Huanuco 173 401 569 565 
Ica 310 552 758 861 
Junin 290 611 728 663 
La Libertad 226 489 648 767 
Lambayeque 165 309 454 477 
Lima 3,709 4,769 5,682 5,976 
Loreto 404 523 581 500 
Madre de Dios 147 377 540 589 
Moquegua 4,122 4,842 4,605 4,149 
Pasco 820 2,499 2,901 1,677 
Piura 343 546 667 621 
Puno 196 583 801 741 
San Martín 217 289 402 439 
Tacna 3,479 4,935 5,427 3,767 
Tumbes 452 952 1,042 976 
Ucayali 363 684 809 908 
Average 753 1,262 1,460 1,328 
Min 132 289 402 439 
Max 4,122 4,935 5,682 5,976 
Coeff. of 
Variation
a
 0.65 0.87 0.94 0.99 
Source: Economic Transparency Portal, MEF. 
Note: a. The ratio of standard deviation to the mean of the distribution. 
 
Issues with current expenditure patterns  
 
The following considerations regarding expenditure composition are important. 
 
Decentralized versus deconcentrated expenditures at the regional level. A considerable part of 
the regional government expenditures must be considered deconcentrated—as opposed to 
decentralized—expenditures (World Bank 2010). This means that subnational governments have 
no discretion over those expenditures. The share of deconcentrated spending channeled through 
the “regional directorates” of central ministries and agencies was estimated by the World Bank 
(2010) to be over two-thirds of the total regional spending. Thus, even though subnational 
governments account for more than half of expenditures on education and health, most of those 
correspond to the wages and salaries paid to teachers, health workers, and so on as 
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deconcentrated expenditures.  Because central line ministers and agencies have the discretion to 
manage their deconcentrated expenditures, there are differences by sector and even by region and 
department on the split between deconcentrated and decentralized expenditures. The canon 
transfers also play a role in the split between deconcentrated and decentralized spending. Since 
canon funds can be spent at the discretion of subnational governments (with the restriction of 
being for capital infrastructure), the share of decentralized expenditures tends to be higher for 
subnational governments that are recipients of canon funds. 
 
Capital spending earmarks and efficiency at the regional and local levels. At both the regional 
and local levels, the requirements and heavy emphasis of current laws on spending a high share 
of available funds on capital expenditures is likely to have a negative impact on the efficiency 
and quality of public services. The decentralization framework appears to ignore the fact that 
current expenditure can be of equal importance in the production and efficient delivery of public 
services. In recent years, there has been pressure from the central authorities concerning the slow 
rate of disbursement by subnational governments, especially by those benefiting from the large 
increases in the canon transfers. The slow disbursement is related in large measure to the 
requirement that those funds are spent on capital infrastructure; the rush to disburse has been 
hurting overall expenditure efficiency (World Bank 2010). 
 
Fiscal disparities at the regional and local levels. The writings of the Peruvian intelligentsia at 
the beginning of the last century (Rühling 2008) show a considerable impetus at the national 
level through the decades for the development of the Peruvian hinterlands and reducing or 
eliminating regional disparities. The reduction of regional disparities has been one of the goals of 
the decentralization process in Peru that started in 2002. Thus, an important question is why the 
decentralization process has not been successful in reducing those geographic disparities. In fact, 
because of the way it has been structured, the decentralization process has actually contributed to 
an increase in regional and municipal disparities. 
 
The assignment of expenditure responsibilities  
 
The allocation of expenditure competencies in the law  
 
The Decentralization Bases Law (Ley de Bases de la Descentralización) of 2002 specifies the 
need to establish a clear division of expenditure responsibilities to promote the accountability of 
public officials to their constituencies. This law adopts the principle of “subsidiarity” (which 
says that responsibilities should be assigned to the lowest level of government capable of 
efficiently providing the service), and establishes three fundamental categories of assignments: 
(a) exclusive responsibilities, (b) shared or concurrent responsibilities, and (c) delegated 
responsibilities. The Decentralization Bases Law also establishes that the process of transfers of 
responsibilities to subnational governments needs to be sequential over time, expenditure-neutral 
(causing no increases in total expenditures), and fully funded (all responsibilities must be 
accompanied by the necessary financial resources for service provision).  
 
The exclusive and concurrent expenditure responsibilities of subnational governments are 
outlined in the Decentralization Bases Law. Box 5.2 lists the assignments to regional 
governments in the Decentralization Bases Law and box 5.3 lists the assignments to local 
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governments. More concrete aspects of the assignments are mandated in the Organic Law of the 
Executive Power (Ley Orgánica del Poder Ejecutivo), the Organic Laws of the Regional and 
Municipal Governments, and sectoral laws and ministerial decrees. 
 
Box 5.2 Expenditure Assignments to Regional 
Governments in the Decentralization Bases Law, 
2002 
 
Exclusive Compentencies 
 
 Approve its organization and budget. 
 Promote and execute public investment projects 
of regional scope. 
 Develop the Regional Socioeconomic 
Development Plan. 
 Design and implement regional programs for 
economic corridors and intermediate cities. 
 Promote the creation of regional businesses and 
economic units. 
 Facilítate export activities. 
 Develop tourist attractions. 
 Develop economic development alliances. 
 Manage land owned by the state in the region. 
 Organize and approve territorial demarcation 
studies. 
 Promote the modernization of small and medium 
enterprises. 
 Promote the sustainability of forest resources. 
 Other. 
 
Concurrent Compentencies 
 
 Education: management of preschool, primary, 
secondary, and higher nonuniversity education 
programs. 
 Public health. 
 Promotion, regulation, and management of 
economic activity at the regional level. 
 Sustainable management of natural resources. 
 Preservation and management of protected 
natural areas. 
 Promotion of cultural activities. 
 Promotion of employment. 
 Promotion of citizen participation. 
 Other. 
 
Source: Decentralization Bases Law. 
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Box 5.3 Expenditure Assignments to Municipal 
Governments in the Decentralization Bases Law, 
2002 
Exclusive Compentencies 
 
 Plan and promote local urban and rural 
development.  
 Regulate zoning, urban development, territorial 
planning, and human settlements. 
 Regulate and manage local public services. 
 Approve its organization and budget. 
 Develop and approve the local development plan. 
 Promote and execute public investment projects 
of local scope. 
 Approve and facilitate the mechanisms for the 
participation, collaboration, and control by 
residents of municipal activities. 
 Issue regulations. 
 Other. 
 
Concurrent Compentencies  
 
 Education: participating in the management of 
education services as established in the law. 
 Public health. 
 Culture, tourism, sports, and recreation. 
 Preservation and management of local natural 
reserves and protected areas. 
 Citizen safety. 
 Conservation of archeological and historical 
monuments. 
 Mass transport and urban transit. 
 Housing and urban renovation. 
 Management of social programs. 
 Management of solid waste. 
 Others as delegated. 
 
Source: Decentralization Bases Law. 
  
 
The most important omission in the current legislation is a clear reference to what functions can 
be “delegated,” the third main category identified in the Decentralization Bases Law. The 
wording of current assignments is such that there are overlaps of several exclusive and 
concurrent responsibilities of regional and local governments. The Organic Laws of Regional 
and Local Governments also repeat and rephrase the assignments in the Decentralization Bases 
Law but also introduce confusion by listing similar delegated responsibilities for the two levels 
of government. This is clearly the case, for example, in the area of territorial planning and land 
use. Overall, there are too many shared or concurrent responsibilities in the assignments of 
expenditure responsibilities to regional and local governments. 
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One of the defining features of expenditure assignments in Peru has been the gradual transfer of 
expenditure responsibilities to regional and local governments. This approach was adopted early 
in the reform process to address the problem of insufficient administrative capacity of 
subnational governments. This process has been regulated in the 2004 Law of the Accreditation 
System (Ley del Sistema de Acreditación). The process was initially implemented by the 
National Council for Decentralization (Consejo Nacional de Descentralización) and is currently 
conducted by the National Office for Decentralization (Secretaria Nacional de la 
Descentralización), which took over the functions of the National Council for Decentralization.
17
 
To a large extent, the process has been one of devolution of expenditure responsibilities from the 
line ministries to the regional governments and has consisted of three stages: 
 
 Certification of the prerequisites required for the assumption of functions 
 Accreditation for meeting the prerequisites 
 The actual implementation of the transfer of responsibility identifying the financing 
needs for delivering the transferred functions.  
 
After a slow start in the transfer of the functions listed in the 2003 Organic Law of Regional 
Governments  (Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales), the “decentralization shock” of 
President Alan García included a deadline for the transfer of the 185 functions, which at the end 
of 2006 still had not been transferred to the regional governments. This deadline was first 
extended to December 2008. In reality, some of the functions were transferred after that date. 
According to the report sent by the Presidency of the Cabinet of Ministers to the Congress in 
May 2009, about 95 percent of the functions had been transferred, involving over 8,000 specific 
functions. 
 
The slow process in the transfers of expenditure responsibilities has been associated with some 
degree of institutional instability. One element of President Toledo’s reform was to create the 
National Council of Decentralization, designed to lead the devolution of responsibilities and also 
serve as a forum for intergovernmental consensus building on decentralization issues. In practice, 
there were strong disagreements between the National Council and central government agencies, 
in particular the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), on the speed and content of the 
decentralization process. Some of these disagreements involved positions taken by the MEF that 
were not always well informed. For example, the MEF at some point seems to have taken the 
position that the financing of regional governments would have to be all transfer based or all 
own-revenue based. However, this position flies on the face of the theory of decentralization and 
best international practice. In the end, the National Council of Decentralization lost the battle, 
and after a period of relative inactivity and ineffectiveness, in 2007 under President García’s 
mandate it was subsumed into a Secretariat of Decentralization as part of the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers. This new institution had no direct representation of subnational authorities. 
Unofficially, the National Association of Regional Governments (Asociación Regional de 
Gobiernos Regionales) has become the representative of regional government interests in the 
decentralization process, and it held periodic meetings with President García. At the local level, 
the several municipal associations have not been able to play a similar role. 
                                                          
17
 The National Office for Decentralization is one of the three offices (secretarías) attached to the Presidency of the 
Cabinet of Ministers (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros). 
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Main issues and problems with expenditure assignments 
 
The process of expenditure assignments still suffers from a number of problems, including the 
following. 
 
Delegated functions continue to be undefined. An important issue is what (concurrent) 
functions or additional functions can be “delegated” to regional and local governments. In a 
unitary system of government, as in Peru, in theory practically all sorts of functions could be 
delegated. However, this distinction is typically of utmost importance in deciding how to finance 
concurrent responsibilities. In the case of delegated responsibilities, central authorities can play a 
bigger role in regulating the service and establishing standards, but they must also assume 
responsibility for their financing using, for example, conditional transfers to the subnational 
governments charged with their implementation. 
 
Despite some progress, expenditure assignments continue to lack clarity. In an effort to further 
clarify expenditure assignments, the National Office for Decentralization (Secretaría Nacional de 
la Descentralización) has completed a full draft of expenditure assignments in the form of a large 
matrix. The matrix offers a multidimensional classification of assignments at the different levels 
of government.
18
 Some parts of the matrix have been officially approved; for example, a decree 
of May 2011 issued the matrix of responsibilities for the transport and communication sector at 
the national, regional, and local levels. However, and significantly, the matrix excludes all 
aspects related to responsibilities for financing. In addition, despite the progress made, the matrix 
does not really help clarify the issue of concurrent responsibilities in any substantial way. The 
reason is that the matrix inserts verbatim without elaboration the text that had been previously 
used in the laws and decrees on this matter. Therefore, the murkiness of concurrent expenditure 
assignments continues to exist. In particular, the matrix still contains a high number of functions 
for which the responsibilities of different levels are identical except for their geographic or 
jurisdictional scope. The matrix still also contains a certain degree of overlapping responsibilities 
for regional and local governments that could be easily clarified. In spite of the adoption of the 
principle of subsidiarity in the Decentralization Bases Law, the design and regulation in all 
sectoral functional areas is actually reserved for the central government, thus diminishing the 
depth of decentralization and the real autonomy of subnational governments (see World Bank 
2010). 
 
The respective roles of deconcentrated and decentralized units at the regional level still need to 
be clearly delineated. Not unrelated to the lack of clarity in expenditure assignments, the daily 
operations of deconcentrated central government agencies and decentralized units, especially at 
                                                          
18
 The draft matrix defines for each line ministry at the central level, regional and local government “competencies” 
and “essential processes.” For each “essential process,” the matrix identifies “functions” in the areas of (a) norming, 
regulation, and policy; (b) planning; (c) administration and execution; and (d) supervision and evaluation. This work 
reflects a compilation effort based on existing decrees (Decretos Legislativos) and organic laws (Leyes Orgánicas de 
los Gobiernos Regionales y Municipales). A significant value added of the draft matrix is to concentrate in a single 
place a dispersed body of laws and regulations. But because the matrix is a compilation of existing decrees and 
organic laws, it does not add any information that does not already exist in those documents. Thus, for example, the 
omission of financing responsibilities in the matrix is due to the fact that the existing decrees and organic laws do 
not address financing responsibilities. 
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the regional level, continues to be confused. Prior to decentralization, many functions of sectoral 
ministries had been deconcentrated to regional directorates and local management units. 
Although many of these offices were incorporated into the regional and local levels with the 
decentralization process, in reality they mostly follow the instructions and directions of line 
ministries (World Bank 2010).
19
 In some cases, such as education, additional institutional 
complexity is added through the role played by community participation organizations (for 
example, Participative Educational Councils at the regional, local, and school levels).
20
 For the 
time being, the subordination of the regional directorates to the regional management bureaus 
still appears to be more nominal than factual, with regional directorate employees keeping a 
closer allegiance to their prior line ministries than to their regional bosses. Line ministries appear 
to play along, reluctant to renounce their authority and claiming lack of administrative capacity 
in regional governments. 
 
This dichotomy continues to be reinforced by the structure of the budget financing sources. The 
financing and expenditure program of the regional directorates are predefined in the central 
government budget and cannot be modified in any way by the regional governments. Similarly, 
the fees and charges collected by the regional directorates do not flow to the regional 
government treasuries but instead remain with the directorates. Clearly, these arrangements, even 
if they can be expected to be transitional, continue to limit in significant ways the autonomy of 
regional governments and reduce the potential gains from decentralization. Regional 
governments have been vocal about the lack of autonomy regarding their budgets.  
 
Insufficient coordination and dialogue between the different levels of government in 
concurrent responsibilities. With so much overlap in expenditure responsibilities, there is much 
need for coordination among central and regional authorities and regional and local authorities. 
However, at the main point of contact between central and regional officials, the “regional 
directorates,” there is still more competition than coordination between the regular staffers that 
came from the deconcentrated units (and who consider themselves line ministry employees) and 
the new appointees by the regional offices (World Bank 2010). Furthermore, there are basically 
no mechanisms to coordinate the regional and local governments; in many ways these two levels 
actively compete with each other. 
 
Lack of a specific mechanism for the resolution of conflicts in expenditure assignments. With 
the exception of presenting a demand before the Constitutional Court, currently the 
                                                          
19
 The regional directorates of each sectoral ministry were deconcentrated agencies, which were incorporated with 
the 2006 “decentralization shock” into the the regional governments’ Regional Management Office, with regional 
presidents having the power to designate the head of the regional directorates. However, the central government 
agencies still set the budget of the regional directorates, and the regional authorities, including the regional 
president, have no power to modify those budgets. The current situation is one of de facto double subordination of 
regional directorates to central and regional authorities. The typical structure of regional governments is based on 
“management bureaus” (Gerencias Regionales), which contain the regional directorates (Direcciones Regionales, the 
prior deconcentrated units of line ministries) and “thematic divisions” (Divisiones Temáticas). The management 
bureaus and the regional directorates control executing units (schools, health centers, and so forth).  
20
 Actions have been taken to address some of the issues. For example, the Managemnet Municipalization Plan 
introduced with President Alan García’s “decentralization shock” would empower municipalities to hire teachers 
and administrative personnel, design local education programs, diversify the curriculum, build and maintain schools, 
and so on. However, this process just got started and the final stage is not until 2015 (World Bank 2010). 
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decentralization laws have no explicit administrative mechanism to address conflict resolution in 
expenditure assignments. On a daily basis, sectoral specialists in the National Budget Office 
(Dirección Nacional de Presupuesto Público) work to clarify possible conflicts, and the most 
serious issues have been addressed in the (informal) meetings between the President of the 
Republic and the regional presidents. In practice, the few demands presented before the 
Constitutional Court have been resolved most of the time in a reasonable period of six months. 
 
Estimating the expenditure needs associated with the transfer of functional assignments. A 
positive aspect of the process of the transfer of functional assignments has been the inclusion of a 
methodology to estimate expenditure needs and financial requirements derived from the new 
expenditure responsibilities. Essentially this process has been implemented using a historical 
costs methodology plus allowing input from the regional governments, line ministries, and other 
stakeholders, and finally decided by the MEF on the basis of two criteria: cost neutrality and no 
new personnel for service delivery. 
 
The use of a historical cost methodology is a reasonable approach for getting started with the 
required funding for newly transferred responsibilities. However, it can lead to problematic 
results in future years, especially if the initial estimates did not accurately reflect spending needs 
and if the historical geographic distribution of services was not fair. Because of dynamic changes 
in population size and composition, prices, and so forth, typically it is necessary to adopt other 
methodologies that can adapt to changing conditions. Examples of those alternative 
methodologies will be discussed in the transfers section below. 
 
 
4. Revenue Assignments 
 
Revenue patterns  
 
As discussed, subnational governments represent a substantial share of total public 
expenditures—around 36.6 percent in 2008. In contrast, the decentralization of revenue sources 
still remains insignificant. Among subnational governments, regional governments have 
practically no own revenues or tax bases assigned to them. Local governments, as we will see, 
have their tax bases (mainly property and vehicle taxes) but raise relatively low revenues and 
have no authority over the bases or rates of those taxes, since those are determined by the central 
authorities. In 2008, the share of own revenues over total expenditures at the subnational level 
was under 13 percent, with the local governments (provincial and district municipalities), of 
course, collecting most of these revenues.  
 
The result is a very high level of transfer dependence of subnational governments in Peru. Table 
5.11 presents the budgets of the different levels of government following the classification of the 
National Directorate of Public Accounting (Dirección Nacional de Contabilidad Pública), the 
official source of public budget accounts in Peru. A potentially misleading aspect of this 
reporting is that regional governments are the recipients of “ordinary resources,” which are not 
classified as revenue sources of the regional governments, but which nevertheless finance an 
important proportion of public expenditures at the regional level. Therefore, the negative 
“financial results” shown for all subnational governments in 2002 and only for regional 
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governments in 2008 (bottom of table 5.8) are, in reality, covered by these other transfers from 
the central government. 
 
Table 5.11 Composition of Revenues by Level of Government, 2002 and 2008 
 (in millions of nuevos soles, and percent shares of total expenditures) 
 2002 2008 
  
Central 
Government 
Subnational 
Governments 
Central 
Government 
Regional 
Governments 
Local 
Governments 
  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
            
Own Revenues 24,939 116.6 1,530 11.0 60,438 136.0 459 3.7 2,688 20.4 
   Taxes and contributions 22,429 104.9 731 5.2 51,470 115.8 14 0.1 1,406 10.7 
   Charges and fees 965 4.5 966 6.9 3,922 8.8 222 1.8 1,583 12.0 
            
Capital Revenues 1,350 6.3 41 0.3 325 0.7 14 0.1 25 0.2 
           
Transfersa -240 -1.1 1,436 10.3 -827 -1.9 2,365 19.0 8,629 65.4 
   Tax on extractive industries    793 5.7   1,669 13.4 5,145 39.0 
            
Net Financial Debt 97 0.5 -51 -0.4 -844 -1.9 67 0.5 120 0.9 
            
Accumulated Balances 267 1.2 466 3.3 5,317 12.0 2,669 21.4 5,170 39.2 
            
Total Revenues 26,414 123.5 3,421 24.6 64,409 144.9 5,574 44.7 16,633 126.1 
            
Total Expenditures 21,383 100.0 13,933 100.0 44,456 100.0 12,479 100.0 13,194 100.0 
            
Financial Result 5,032 23.5 -10,512 -75.4 19,953 44.9 -6,905 -55.3 3,439 26.1 
           
Sources: MEF and DNCP. 
Note: a. The full amount of property income of regional and municipal governments during 2002 (usually reported 
as current revenues in the Peruvian accounting system) is assumed to correspond to transfers from canon, 
sobrecanon, and royalties. 
 
 
The most important thing to highlight is that the current situation with revenue assignments (and 
mobilization) is starkly different for regional and local governments. Even though regional 
governments have been given additional expenditure responsibilities, they have not yet been 
assigned any autonomous tax revenue sources. 
 
The composition of regional revenues  
 
In the grand design of revenue assignments, Decree No. 955, the Fiscal Decentralization Law of 
2004 introduced (as an incentive for the formation of macroregions) a hefty 50 percent revenue 
sharing for the new regions in the national value-added tax, and the personal income tax (in some 
categories). As mentioned, this revenue sharing never materialized because of the rejection of the 
macroregions in the 2005 referendum. However, what is most notable is that the grand design 
never included any degree of tax autonomy for regional governments. 
 
The composition of regional government revenues is shown in table 5.12. Note that in some 
years, there are revenues from own taxes—around 1 percent of total regional revenues in 2005 
and 2006—corresponding to a special levy charged by some regions on goods originating in tax-
free zones. Practically all regional revenues come from other sources, and their composition has 
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not changed significantly in the last decade. Two sources, central transfers and income from own 
assets, represented 85 percent of all regional revenues in 2008, as shown in table 5.12. The 
revenues from the canon, sobrecanon, and royalties are included in the “income from assets” 
category and represent the most important source of capital grant financing at the regional level. 
 
Table 5.12 Revenues of Regional Governments, 2004–08 
(percent of total revenues) 
   2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
   (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Current Revenues   53 57 73 65 67 
 Contributions  0 0 0 0 0 
 Taxes  0 1 1 0 0 
 Fines  0 0 1 0 0 
 Other current revenues   1 1 3 4 6 
 Service charges  8 7 7 4 4 
 Income from own assets (including canon)  32 40 54 53 52 
 Fees  3 3 3 2 2 
 Sales of goods  7 5 5 3 3 
Capital Revenues   1 1 1 1 0 
 Repayments  0 0 0 0 0 
 Other capital revenues   0 0 0 0 0 
 Sales of assets   0 0 1 1 0 
Transfers   46 42 26 34 33 
        
Total (excepting the financing of budget balances) 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: MEF 2010. 
 
A more detailed account of the category of “income from own assets” is given in table 5.13. This 
includes income from financial assets (mostly in the form of interest from bank deposits) and 
income from the canon, sobrecanon, and royalties; the latter represent between 78 and 90 percent 
of total income from own assets. In a standard classification of revenues, the canon, sobrecanon, 
and royalties would be considered revenue sharing and, therefore, a part of transfers. The canon 
from mineral resources and oil are the largest items in “income from own assets.” 
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Table 5.13 Regional Income from Own Assets, 2004–08 (in nuevos soles and percents) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
      
Total 449,227,602 726,884,857 1,097,670,363 2,076,871,031 1,900,394,298 
   (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
 
Financial Assets  
  
1.07 0.82 1.23 2.44 2.89 
  Interest 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 
  Interest from banks 0.95 0.78 1.20 2.39 2.83 
  Interest from loans  0.08 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 
  Other                                                                            0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Real Assets   99.02 99.07 98.90 97.70 97.11 
  Building leasing 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.05 
  Other leasing 0.99 0.31 0.25 0.20 0.37 
  Rental property 1.98 1.24 0.98 0.59 0.62 
  Canon from forests 0.05 6.33 0.14 0.07 0.05 
  Canon from gas 4.06 10.97 8.98 7.52 9.91 
  Canon from hydropower 5.75 3.72 2.94 1.80 1.48 
  Canon from minerals 23.73 30.07 40.16 62.17 51.02 
  Canon from fishing 2.24 1.00 1.16 0.50 0.77 
  Canon from oil 29.98 23.82 19.31 10.46 14.73 
  
Canon from 
Telecomunications 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Concesions 0.50 0.30 0.22 0.13 0.13 
  Right-of-way contracts 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  
Annual fees for mineral 
explotation rights 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  Other                                                                            0.09 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 
  Participation in contracts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Royalties 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Royalties FOCAM 0.00 0.00 2.88 1.64 1.92 
  Royalties mineras 0.00 0.00 5.22 3.50 3.45 
  Customs revenues 17.35 12.71 10.23 6.29 8.04 
  Sobrecanon from oil 12.20 8.23 6.32 2.75 4.48 
  
Profits of public 
enterprises 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                                Other                                                                             -0.10 0.11 -0.13 -0.14 0.00 
  
Exchange rate 
differential  -0.11 0.06 -0.15 -0.15 -0.01 
  Other                                                                            0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Source: MEF 2010. 
 
Regional revenues categorized as transfers on average represented 36 percent of total regional 
revenues during 2004–08. At the start of the period, practically all transfers came from “internal: 
public sector” transfers, in particular, the Regional Equalization Fund (Fondo de Compensación 
Regional, FONCOR) capital transfer (covered in the next section). From 2006 on, transfers from 
“internal: nonpublic sector,” in particular, donations from the National Fund for Labor Training 
and Employment Promotion (Fondo Nacional de Capacitación Laboral y de Promoción del 
Empleo, FONDOEMPLEO) and profits from public corporations, represented over half of total 
transfers (table 5.14). 
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Table 5.14 Regional Government Transfers Structure, 2004–2008 
(in nuevos soles and as percent of yearly total) 
   2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
      
Total 641,491,485 755,964,681 527,250,702 1,329,530,664 1,213,242,227 
   (%) (% (%) (%) (%) 
  External sources 3 3 5 1 2 
  
Internal: Nonpublic sector  
(including FONDEMPLEO and 
Public enterprise profits 
0 0 30 54 52 
  
Internal: Public sector 
(including FONCOR) 
97 97 65 45 46 
  Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: MEF 2010. 
 
 
Table 5.15 Composition of Regional Revenues, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2009 
 (in millions of nuevos soles, and percent shares of current and capital revenues) 
  2004 % 2006 % 2008 % 2009
a
 % 
Own Revenues 303 21.9 421 17 632 14.5 730.2 18.6 
     Taxes and contributions 2 0.2 13 0.5 13 0.3 9.1 0.2 
     Charges and fees 160 11.6 199 8 217 5 384.5 9.8 
     Other 141 10.2 209 8.5 402 9.2 336.6 8.6 
         
Transfers (net of ordinary resources) 1,070 77.3 2,026 82 3,708 85.2 3,176 81.0 
     Canon, sobrecanon, and royalties 350 25.3 956 38.7 1,669 38.3 1,714.3 43.7 
          Mining canon 107 7.7 441 17.8 970 22.3 933.1 23.8 
          Oil canon and sobrecanon 189 13.7 281 11.4 365 8.4 190.4 4.9 
          Gas canon 18 1.3 99 4 188 4.3 193.2 4.9 
          Other canon and royalties 36 2.6 136 5.5 146 3.3 397.6 10.1 
     Custom duties 78 5.6 112 4.5 153 3.5 128.5 3.3 
     FONCOR 360 26 430 17.4 674 15.5 ― 0.0 
     Others 281 20.3 527 21.3 1,213 27.9 1,333 34.0 
         
Current Revenues (net of ordinary 
resources) 1,373 99.2 2,447 99 4,340 99.7 3,906 99.6 
Capital revenues 11 0.8 25 1 14 0.3 17 0.4 
         
Current and Capital Revenues 1,384 100 2,472 100 4,354 100 3,923 100 
         
Sources: MEF and DNCP. 
Note: a. FONCOR data not available for 2009. 
― n.a. = not available.  
 
Table 5.15 presents a conventional classification of regional revenues excluding “ordinary 
resources,” the gap-filling transfer regional governments receive at the end of the fiscal period to 
finance the deconcentrated regional directorate budgets. We can see there that the most important 
transfer program in 2009 was from extractive industries (canon), representing more than 44 
32 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
percent of total revenues.
21
 The FONCOR, the equalization transfer program at the regional 
level, is also a significant revenue source, but in 2008 it contributed less than half of the revenues 
coming from the canon (data for 2009 were not available). But note that in 2004, before the rapid 
increase in the international prices of natural resources preceding the global financial crisis, the 
revenues from the canon and those from FONCOR were roughly equivalent. In all, the relative 
importance of revenues from extractive industries increased significantly during the period, 
reflecting the rising trend in international prices for Peruvian natural resource exports.  
 
Significantly, the relative importance of the different revenue sources varies considerably across 
regions (table 5.16). However, some general patterns can be identified. For example, we can 
identify a large group that is highly dependent on transfers. Current transfers represented over 95 
percent of regional revenues in Cajamarca, Callao, Cusco, Ica, Loreto, and Tacna in 2008. The 
regional governments that are relatively less dependent on transfers include the Metropolitan 
Municipality of Lima (52 percent of total), Arequipa (81 percent), and Amazonas (82 percent).  
 
Canon funds are the main source of revenue in the regions of Ancash, Moquegua, Pasco, and 
Tacna, representing over 77 percent of total revenues. The geographic location of the regional 
governments clearly conditions their revenue structure. Location matters for natural resource 
deposits and also for the presence of international borders. For example, in 2008 Callao, as the 
international seaport of the country, received 18 percent of its resources from customs 
revenues.
22
 
      
                                                          
21
 Note that taxes and contributions consist exclusively of import duties collected by the region of Tacna.  
22
 The “customs revenues” corresponds to 2 percent of the revenues collected at customs offices and shared with the 
provincial and district municipalities where the customs offices are located. Callao has the most important seaport 
and airport in the country and, therefore, the largest customs revenues. Ten percent of the customs revenues in 
Callao are earmarked to a provincial education fund. 
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Table 5.16 Regional Governments Current and Capital Revenues, 2008  
Regions 
Am
azo
nas 
Anc
ash 
Apu
rim
ac 
Are
quip
a 
Aya
cuc
ho 
Caj
ama
rca 
Call
ao 
Cus
co 
Hua
nca
velic
a 
Huá
nuc
o 
Ica 
Juní
n 
La 
Libe
rtad 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
(1) Taxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
On wealth  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
On production and 
consumption 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(2) Contributions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(3) Nontax Revenues 10 1 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 
Fees 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Sales of goods 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Service charges 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 
Rental property (excluding 
the canon) 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other current revenues 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(4) Current Transfers 82 90 84 81 91 98 99 97 89 89 96 94 90 
Canon  36 77 7 32 13 53 56 69 37 11 29 28 43 
Annual fees for mineral 
explt. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Customs revenues 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
“Recursos ordinarios” 
(Ordinary resources 
excluding FONCOR) 
41 13 73 48 73 43 24 27 49 71 64 62 45 
Other public transfers 5  5 2 5 3 1 2 3 7 2 4 2 
(5) Current Revenues 
(1+2+3+4) 
91 91 86 85 93 99 100 98 90 91 98 97 94 
(6) Capital Revenues 9 9 14 15 7 1 0 2 10 9 2 3 6 
Sales of assets  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital transfers (including 
FONCOR) 
9 9 14 15 7 1 0 1 10 9 2 3 5 
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Lam
baye
que 
Lim
a 
Lore
to 
Mad
re 
de 
Dios 
Moq
uegu
a 
M.
M. 
Lim
a 
Pasc
o 
Piur
a 
Pun
o 
San 
Mar
tín 
Tac
na 
Tum
bes 
Uca
yali 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
 
(1) Taxes 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
On wealth  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
On production and 
consumption 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
(2) Contributions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(3) Nontax Revenues 5 3 2 14 1 0 1 3 1 4 1 2 9 
Fees 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Sales of goods 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Service charges 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Rental property 
(excluding the canon) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other current revenues 0 1 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 
(4) Current Transfers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canon  82 94 97 82 95 53 94 93 92 90 97 94 89 
Annual fees for mineral 
explt. 
20 39 52 49 86 22 70 32 31 59 85 30 62 
Customs revenues 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Recursos ordinarios 
(Ordinary resources 
excluding FONCOR) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other public transfers 59 52 41 32 10 31 22 53 59 29 11 61 26 
(5) Current revenues 
(1+2+3+4) 
3 3 3 0 0 0 1 8 2 2 0 3 2 
(6) Capital revenues 87 97 99 96 96 54 95 96 93 94 99 96 98 
Sales of assets    0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital transfers 
(including FONCOR) 
13 3 1 4 4 46 5 6 7 6 1 4 2 
Source: MEF 2010.  
 
In summary, regional governments rely almost fully on transfers from the central 
government. In those regions with natural resource deposits, canon revenues are more 
important than any other type of transfer, including those from the capital transfer, 
FONCOR. Neither own tax revenues, which are practically nonexistent (with the 
exception of special customs charges), nor nontax revenues (fees, charges, and so forth), 
are important. 
 
The composition of local revenues 
 
Revenue assignments to municipal governments are regulated by Law Decree No. 776, 
which establishes taxes on property as the main tax revenue source for provincial and 
district municipalities. Provincial municipalities are assigned the tax on vehicle property, 
and district municipalities are assigned the tax on land and buildings and the tax on 
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property transfers (alcabala). Table 5.17 summarizes the composition of current revenues 
at the municipal level. Even though municipalities enjoy a certain degree of tax autonomy 
that is absent at the regional level, the revenues actually collected from these sources do 
not amount to much. In particular, total own tax collections have been historically lower 
than the sum of charges and fees, which includes street cleaning, road tolls, parks 
maintenance, public safety services, and construction permits. 
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Table 5.17 Composition of Current Revenues at the Municipal Level, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 
2009 (in millions of nuevos soles, and percent shares of current revenues) 
  2004 % 2006 % 2008 % 2009 % 
             
Taxes 638 11.1 720 9.6 1,296 9.9 1,480 10.4 
     Property 532 9.3 627 8.4 1,130 8.6 1,227 8.6 
          Vehicle property 61 1.1 57 0.8 95 0.7 100 0.7 
          Property (land and buildings) 407 7.1 462 6.2 615 4.7 735 5.2 
          Property transfer (alcabala) 64 1.1 108 1.4 421 3.2 393 2.8 
     Others 106 1.8 93 1.2 166 1.3 252 1.8 
         
Other Own Revenues 1,441 25.1 1,407 18.8 1,963 15 2,339 16.4 
     Charges and fees 1,032 18 1,010 13.5 1,336 10.2 1,694 11.9 
     Others 409 7.1 396 5.3 627 4.8 645 4.5 
         
Transfers 3,670 63.8 5,369 71.6 9,813 75.1 10,405 73.2 
     Canon, sobrecanon, and royalties 705 12.3 2,428 32.4 5,145 39.4 5,352 37.6 
          Mining canon 324 5.6 1,248 16.6 3,341 25.6 3,528 24.8 
          Mining royalties 0 0 299 4 401 3.1 417 2.9 
          Oil canon and sobrecanon 220 3.8 381 5.1 579 4.4 432 3.0 
          Gas canon 54 0.9 297 4 546 4.2 658 4.6 
          Other canon and royalties 107 1.9 203 2.7 277 2.1 317 2.2 
     FONCOMUN 1,729 30.1 2,323 31 3,257 24.9 3,709 26.1 
     Others 1,236 21.5 618 8.2 1,411 10.8 784 5.5 
         
Current Revenues 5,749 100 7,495 100 13,073 100 14,224 100.0 
         
Sources: MEF and DNCP from Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda 2011. 
 
Therefore, there is also a high degree of dependency on intergovernmental transfers at the 
local level. Overall, transfers represented almost three-quarters of the municipal budget in 
2009. Transfer revenues from extractive industries (canon) and the municipal 
compensation transfer fund (FONCOMUN) are the two most important sources, 
representing around 37 percent and 26 percent of municipal revenues, respectively, in 
2009.  
 
Capital revenues represent a small share of municipal budgets. As shown in table 5.18, 
capital revenues have oscillated between 3 and 4 percent of total revenues and correspond 
mostly to capital transfers from the central government.  
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Table 5.18 Capital Revenues of Municipal Government, 2006–08 
(in nuevos soles and as a percent of total revenues)  
 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 
       
Total Capital Revenues 291,898,653 3.9 295,212,994 2.4 401,401,123 3.0 
    Capital transfers 262,058,301 3.5 284,176,993 2.3 375,999,029 2.8 
    Sales of assets 29,495,989 0.4 10,880,591 0.1 25,249,067 0.2 
    Other  344,362 0.0 155,410 0.0 153,026 0.0 
       
Source: MEF. 
  
Tax assignments and revenue mobilization 
 
Tax assignments at the municipal level are regulated by the Law on Municipal Taxation 
(Ley de Tributación Municipal) of 1993. The law assigns to district municipalities the 
property tax on land and buildings (impuesto predial), the property transfer tax (alcabala), 
the local entertainment tax (except for sports), and the tax on games (except for lotteries). 
For provincial municipalities, the 1993 law assigns the vehicle tax and the tax on betting 
and lotteries. In addition, Law Decree No. 776 establishes the tax rates to be applied in 
each case and the sharing of collections between provinces and districts. A summary of 
these regulations is presented in table 5.19. From that information it is clear that local 
governments in Peru are given no autonomy to either define the tax bases or set the rates 
for the taxes assigned them. All these decisions are made centrally. Therefore, local 
discretion about how much to collect taxes is constrained to the realm of tax 
administration and enforcement efforts. 
 
Table 5.19 Main Features of Municipal Tax Revenue Assignments 
District Municipalities Revenue Shares Tax Rates 
 Districts Provinces  
    
Tax on land and buildings 
100% (5% for  
cadastre 
maintenance) 
0% 
< 15 UIT:  
15–60 UIT:  
> 60 UIT: 
0.2% (or 
0.6%) 
0.6% 
1.0% 
Property transfers (alcabala) 50% 
50% (to Municipal 
Investment Fund) 
 3% (first 3 UIT exempted)
a
 
Games (pinball, bingo, etc.) 100% 0% 10% 
Public shows 100% 0% 
Bullfighting: 
Horse racing: 
Others: 
  5% 
10% 
15% 
    
Provincial municipalities:    
Vehicle property 0% 100% 1% (minimum: 1.5% UIT) 
Betting 40% 60% 20% (horse rising: 12%) 
Games (lotteries) 0% 100% 10% 
    
Source: Gómez, Martinez-Vazquez,
 
and Sepúlveda 2010, based on Law Decree No. 677. 
Note: a. The UIT (Tributary Tax Unit, Unidad Impositiva Tributaria) is a monetary measure used to set the 
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value of taxes, fees, penalties, and other legal payments. Since 2006, the UIT has increased 50 nuevos soles 
per year, reaching 3,600 nuevos soles (US$1,283 on December 31, 2010), in 2010. The same value was 
used in 2011. 
 
The lack of true tax autonomy is not the only obstacle to local revenue mobilization in 
Peru. Many municipalities, especially those in rural areas, lack the administrative and 
technical capacity to collect significant amounts of revenues from the taxes that have 
been assigned to them. In reality, many local governments do not have a complete 
cadastre of properties, and many of the existing cadastres have not been regularly 
updated. Taxpayer morale and official attitudes also play a role. A good share of the 
population still does not appear to fully understand or accept their role in supporting the 
financing of the local public goods and services they receive. Often, local authorities 
accept, rather passively, the fundamentally voluntary contributions of taxpayers (Alfaro 
and Rühling 2007). 
 
The lack of revenue mobilization continues to be a reality at the local level. Table 5.20 
presents annual collections for municipal taxes for 2006–09. The real estate property tax 
is by far the most important municipal tax (at almost half of municipal tax revenues for 
2009), even though the property transfer tax (alcabala) has been rapidly gaining 
importance, representing almost one-quarter of total collections in 2009. But the fact is 
that most municipal governments, including those receiving or not receiving canon 
revenues, are not making good use of their own revenue sources.  
 
Table 5.20 Municipal Tax Collections, 2006–09 (in nuevos soles) 
 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 
On property   627,250,136 86.4 965,758,839 88.4 1,130,141,727 86.3 1,227,364,075 83.3 
   Real estate property (predial)   462,317,304 63.6 552,200,650 50.5 614,593,810 46.9 734,904,183 49.9 
   Property transfer (alcabala)  108,162,028 14.9 346,571,980 31.7 420,630,736 32.1 392,464,228 26.7 
    Vehicles  56,770,803 7.8 66,986,209 6.1 94,917,181 7.2 99,995,664 6.8 
On production and 
consumption   55,290,116 7.6 85,172,945 7.8 121,802,048 9.3 122,547,794 8.3 
    Slot machines 26,270,728 3.6 55,502,776 5.1 93,806,862 7.2 88,626,705 6.0 
    Entertainment  14,914,489 2.1 16,611,346 1.5 15,505,283 1.2 19,425,208 1.3 
    Casinos    4,477,589 0.6 5,717,420 0.5 6,521,192 0.5 6,333,878 0.4 
    Games 8,996,343 1.2 6,626,010 0.6 5,386,495 0.4 7,617,112 0.5 
    Gambling  624,676 0.1 715,391 0.1 582,215 0.0 544,891 0.0 
Other  43,804,601 6.0 41,716,223 3.8 58,187,414 4.4 122,666,345 8.3 
Total Municipal Taxes 726,344,853 100.0 1,092,648,006 100.0 1,310,131,189 100.0 1,472,578,214 100.0 
Source: MEF. 
 
The use of fees and charges is also regulated by the Law on Municipal Taxation (Ley de 
Tributación Municipal) of 1993. Unlike taxes, fees and charges are voluntary payments 
for receiving particular services. This source of revenue is as important as local taxes. 
Table 5.21 provides the breakdown of the different fees (related to regulation and control 
activities) and charges directly related to service provision that are being used and their 
relative importance. 
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Table 5.21 Fees and Charges at the Municipal Level, 2006–09 (in nuevos soles) 
 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 
Fees (for) 871,715,561 86.3 1,021,256,915 87.0 1,166,050,405 87.3 691,982,988 90.3 
    Health 258,589,516 25.6 309,804,301 26.4 332,196,286 24.9 10,141,940 1.3 
    Housing  176,994,535 17.5 213,252,026 18.2 252,727,251 18.9 134,461,473 17.5 
    Transport and 
comunications 166,661,147 16.5 191,713,287 16.3 231,240,774 17.3 247,040,361 32.2 
    Industry, mining, and 
commerce  70,120,265 6.9 80,338,047 6.8 92,229,241 6.9 109,451,780 14.3 
    General administration   49,045,887 4.9 55,942,119 4.8 59,671,883 4.5 89,633,395 11.7 
    Education 15,454,124 1.5 16,139,945 1.4 17,745,850 1.3 16,572,487 2.2 
    Agriculture   2,883,240 0.3 4,090,088 0.3 5,804,802 0.4 6,917,528 0.9 
    Justice and police 12,080 0.0 1,425 0.0 0 0.0 9,629,600 1.3 
    Other  131,954,766 13.1 149,975,677 12.8 174,434,318 13.1 68,134,424 8.9 
Service charges (for) 138,611,065 13.7 152,244,243 13.0 169,978,425 12.7 74,285,024 9.7 
    Health 22,943,536 2.3 17,469,438 1.5 22,966,701 1.7 16,852,192 2.2 
    Education, recreation, and 
culture 8,127,323 0.8 17,321,162 1.5 22,026,253 1.6 33,985,539 4.4 
    Transport, communications, 
and storage 9,980,146 1.0 9,660,404 0.8 10,211,523 0.8 22,131,506 2.9 
    Agriculture and minerals   825,655 0.1 844,196 0.1 946,184 0.1 1,315,787 0.2 
    Industrial 245 0.0 2,539 0.0 16,602 0.0 0 0.0 
    Other  96,734,159 9.6 106,946,504 9.1 113,811,161 8.5 0 0.0 
Total 1,010,326,626 100.0 1,173,501,158 100.0 1,336,028,830 100.0 766,268,012 100.0 
Source: MEF.  
 
The variations in per capita own revenue collections are very large. Table 5.22 shows the 
basic statistics for own revenues per capita for all 1,834 municipalities in Peru for 2008. 
Own revenues are composed of (a) local taxes on property (property, property transfers 
[alcabala], and vehicle taxes), (b) other local taxes on production and consumption items 
that account for little revenue, (c) fees, and (d) charges from service delivery. 
Interestingly, all these types of own revenues appear to follow similar distributions across 
municipal governments, in revenues per capita and in their low median values—under 2 
nuevos soles per capita—indicating the high number of municipalities that do not collect 
any own revenues. The high coefficients of variation for all sources reflect differences in 
tax bases and effort; while some local governments make an effort to collect own 
revenues, many others simply rely on intergovernmental transfers. Table 5.22 clearly 
indicates an asymmetric distribution of revenue raising, with a high concentration in 
metropolitan Lima. 
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Table 5.22 Per Capita Own Revenues at the Municipal Level—Basic Statistics, 2008 (in 
nuevos soles) 
 
All Property 
Taxes (incl. 
vehicle tax) 
Total Taxes Fees Service Charges 
Total Own 
Revenues Per 
Capita 
Maximum 1,083.0 1,230.4 1,071.5 1,425.7 2,386.7 
    (municipality) (Lima) (Lima) 
(San Isidro - 
Lima) 
(Machupicchu - 
Urubamba) 
(Lima) 
Median 0.4 0.5 1.7 2.0 19.3 
 
Mean 
11.6 12.5 11.3 7.3 52.8 
Standard deviation 53.7 58.8 56.0 40.3 156.0 
Coefficient of 
variation
a 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.5 3.0 
Source: MEF. 
Note: a. The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the distribution. 
 
Certain issues are salient in terms of revenue performance. While broadly recommended 
and used as a main local revenue source, the real estate property tax in Peru performs far 
below international standards.
23
 Table 5.23 shows the productivity of the property tax for 
a number of selected regions of the world and selected Latin American countries. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries appear to be the 
ones taking the most advantage of this revenue source, with a ratio of property tax 
collections to GDP of over 2 percent during 2000–04. It is true that the property tax base 
can be expected to be greater in developed countries, but the productivity of the property 
tax in Peru, at 0.17 percent of GDP, is low even when compared to similar countries in 
Latin America, which on average collect almost three times as much as does Peru. In the 
region, only Ecuador and Guatemala exhibit a lower property tax performance than Peru. 
 
Table 5.23 Property Tax Collections as a Share of GDP, Selected Regions and Countries, 
1990–2007 (in percent) 
International Averages
a
 
 
  Selected Latin American Countries 
 
 1990–99 2000–04    1990–99 2000–07 
        
All countries 0.75 (59) 1.04 (65)   Argentina 0.63 0.53 
OECD countries 1.44 (16) 2.12 (18)   Bolivia ― 0.65 
Transition countries 0.54 (20) 0.68 (18)   Brazil 0.32 0.43 
Developing countries 0.42 (23) 0.60 (29)   Chile 0.60 0.66 
Latin America 0.36 (8) 0.37 (10)   Colombia 0.36 0.50 
     Ecuador 0.12 0.13 
     Guatemala 0.08 0.14 
     Mexico 0.18 0.18 
     Paraguay 0.36 0.39 
     Peru ― 0.17 
     Uruguay 0.61 0.71 
Sources: Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, and Youngman
 
2008; and Sepúlveda and Martinez-Vazquez
 
2011. 
Note: a. Parentheses display the number of countries considered in each sample average. 
― = negligible.  
                                                          
23
 There is an extensive literature supporting the assignment of the property tax to local governments; see 
Oates (1999); and Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, and Youngman (2008, 2010). 
 Fiscal Decentralization in Peru: A Perspective on Recent Developments and Future Challenges 41 
 
 
It is not entirely clear what is behind the low revenue mobilization performance of Peru’s 
municipalities. In a 2011 paper, Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda 
find, for the most part, a positive relation between transfers and total own revenue 
collections for Peru’s municipalities. The only exception, although not consistent, is for 
the FONCOMUN transfer, where the impact is negative.
24
 Overall, these authors find that 
the effect of total transfers on total own revenue collections is positive and robust for the 
entire group of municipalities and separately for the subgroups of district and provincial 
municipalities. In addition, they find that the effect of total transfers on total own revenue 
collections is dominated by the behavior of nontax revenues. In particular, it appears that 
canon transfers have a positive effect on the level of revenue collection, and particularly 
on the nontax component of revenue collection. The causes for this relationship are not 
clear, but Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda speculate that it might 
be related to a greater capacity of subnational governments receiving the canon to 
provide public services and charge for them, with a greater demand for these services, a 
greater ability to pay on the part of the population, or both.  
 
Issues with revenue assignments and patterns 
 
The overall low degree of revenue autonomy or, similarly, the high degree of dependence 
on intergovernmental transfers of subnational governments in Peru, exposes the system to 
serious weaknesses. Most important, the dependency on revenues from transfers limits 
the efficiency and accountability of subnational governments. It also reduces the overall 
level of fiscal responsibility of subnational governments because it is unlikely that 
subnational authorities will perceive the correct marginal cost of public funds when their 
cost is simply to ask for more funds from the central government. A transfer-dependent 
system poorly complements the emphasis on a hard budget constraint and borrowing 
discipline introduced in other elements of Peru’s decentralization design.  
 
Local government issues 
 
Local government issues include the following. 
 
Low levels of revenue mobilization at the local level. Local governments have low levels 
of revenue autonomy but, in addition, they do not use the revenue autonomy they do have 
very well. One source of this problem is the low level of administrative capacity due to 
the lack of resources to modernize the administrative process and low skills of local 
personnel. Other factors play a role, including a low taxpaying culture and poor 
performance of local officials. Periodic amnesties are common. Of course, all these 
problems tend to be more acute in smaller and rural municipalities. Thus, there is ample 
room for building administrative capacity and improving revenue collections. Some of 
these problems have been addressed with the creation of semiautonomous Tax 
                                                          
24
 The evidence on the impact of transfers on tax effort in prior studies is mixed, with Aragón and Gayoso 
(2005) finding a negative relationship and Melgarejo and Rabanal (2006) finding a mostly positive 
relationship. 
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Administration Agencies (SATs) in a number of large municipalities (see box 5.4). The 
question remains whether the SATs can be introduced in smaller municipalities. 
 
                              
 
Low tax autonomy. While having uniform tax bases is a desirable feature of local taxes, 
depriving local governments of any discretion in selecting tax rates limits tax autonomy 
and ultimately the operational efficiency and accountability of local expenditures. In 
addition, the current assignment of tax sources at the municipal level may be too limited. 
The question is whether other suitable tax instruments can be identified for assignment at 
the local level in Peru.  
 
Reversing the assignments to district and provincial municipalities. The assignment of 
property taxes at the district level and vehicle taxes at the provincial level should perhaps 
be reversed. Many district municipalities lack the administrative capacity to administer 
and enforce real estate property taxes, including maintaining a cadastre, and for that 
reason provincial municipalities could do a better job of administering this tax; less than 
20 percent of district municipalities report having a local cadastre of properties. 
Switching assignments at the local level would mean that the vehicle taxes would be 
reassigned from provincial to district municipalities. Even though this change could make 
a lot of sense, the reform would imply not insignificant losses to many district 
municipalities. One way to address this issue would be to introduce revenue sharing for 
property taxes between provincial and district municipalities. 
 
Regional issues 
 
At the regional level, the most significant design flaw has been the complete lack of 
consideration given at all stages of the decentralization process to providing governments 
at this level with their own autonomous tax sources. Thus, despite the increase in 
expenditure responsibilities in recent years, regional governments still lack the means to 
adjust their financing to the changing requirements of those services. It is not clear what 
Box 5.4 The Tax Administration Agencies (SATs)  
 
The problems with local tax administration capacity were 
acknowledged earlier during the process of administrative 
deconcentration. In 1996, a SAT was introduced in Lima. Its good 
performance led to the introduction of new SATs in Trujillo in 1998, 
in Piura in 1999, and later in Ica, Huancamayo, and other 
municipalities, nine in all. 
 
The SATs are local tax administration agencies under the municipal 
governments and enjoy a high degree of financial and administrative 
autonomy. Typically, they are financed with a share of collected taxes 
and fines (ranging from 3 to 10 percent.) 
 
Generally, while the SATs have been quite successful in increasing 
tax collections (CAD 2004), the models may be difficult to export to 
smaller municipalities because of the up-front investments required in 
personnel and equipment (von Haldenwang 2010).  
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has kept central authorities from considering the assignments of taxes to regional 
governments. Administratively, creating new fiscal space for the regional governments 
does not necessarily require the creation of a new tax administration layer. International 
experience provides good examples of how regional autonomous taxes (where the 
regional authorities have autonomy to vary tax rates) can be introduced, with the taxes 
being collected by the central tax administration.  
 
 
5. Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
The most important transfer at the local and regional levels in Peru is the canon. The 
canon and other important transfers being used at the local level, including the 
FONCOMUN, and at the regional level, including the FONCOR, are discussed below. 
 
The canon 
 
Some regional and municipal governments in Peru are entitled to share in the income tax 
on certain extractive industries, in the form of the canon, sobrecanon, and royalties.
25
 
These revenues, which are distributed on an origin basis, have increased dramatically in 
recent years due to the escalation of international prices for Peruvian exports of natural 
resources. The revenues from the canon represented up to 26.5 percent of total 
subnational expenditures and 9.7 percent of the general government outlays in 2008. 
 
Law No. 27506, the Law on the Canon of 2001, establishes the total share of subnational 
governments of the revenues collected through the income tax on extractive industries 
(which is generally 50 percent), and the procedure for computing the share that 
corresponds to each subnational government. The distribution procedure is summarized 
in table 5.24 for the canon from mining, gas, hydroenergy, fishing, and forest resources. 
The revenues from this type of canon represent 77 percent of total revenues from 
extractive industries for subnational governments in 2008. The beneficiaries are the 
district municipalities, provincial muncipalities, and regions where the extraction 
activities are located; no direct transfer from this revenue source is made to jurisdictions 
outside those geographic areas where the resources are located. 
 
                                                          
25
 In the interest of brevity, we refer to all those revenues from natural resources shared with subnational 
governments (in order of revenue importance, the canon from mineral exploitation, the canon and 
sobrecanon from oil, royalties from mineral exploitations, the canon from gas, and so forth) as the canon. 
The central authorities allocate the taxes paid by the mining companies to the territories where the tax 
revenues are generated.  
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Table 5.24 Distribution Procedure for the Revenues from the Mining and Gas Canon 
Share (%) Beneficiaries Distribution Criteria
a,b 
10 District municipalities within which the natural 
resources are exploited 
Equal share 
 
25 Municipalities of the province within which the 
natural resources are exploited 
According to population and the index 
of unmet basic needs 
40 Municipalities of the region within which the natural 
resources are exploited 
According to population and the index 
of unmet basic needs 
25 80% to the regional government of the region and   
20% to the universities in the region 
 
Source: Law No. 27506 (the Law on the Canon) in Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda 
2011. 
Note: a. These criteria are applicable to the revenues collected from mining, gas, hydroenergy, fishing, and 
forest resources but do not apply to the oil canon. b. The index of unmet basic needs measures the 
percentage of the population with at least one basic need that has not been satisfied. The basic needs 
considered in the index are electricity, water, and sewerage services. 
 
The distribution of oil canon and sobrecanon (which represent 14 percent of subnational 
revenues from extractive industries) is also based on geographic shares, but they vary in 
each region (table 5.25). As in the case of the canon for mining and gas, the funds are 
targeted to be used on infrastructure projects; however, the regions of Loreto, Ucayali, 
and Huánuco are allowed to use 20 percent of the funds for recurrent expenses. 
 
Table 5.25 Distribution Criteria for the Canon from Oil  
 
Loreto 
(%) 
Ucayali 
(%) 
Piura 
(%) 
Tumbes 
(%) 
Puerto Inca 
Huánuco 
(%) 
Regional Government 52 20 20 20 0 
District Municipalities 0 10 0 0 0 
Provincial Municipalities 0 20 20 20 0 
Municipalities of the Region  40 40 50 50 0 
National Universities 5 5 5 5 0 
Advanced Institutes  3 5 5 5 0 
Municipal Councils of the District of 
Puerto Inca 
    
100 
Source: MEF. 
 
The distribution of mining royalties (which represent 7 percent of regional revenues from 
extractive industries) is contained in the Law on Royalties from Mineral Exploitations 
(Ley de Regalías Mineras, No. 28258) of 2004. This law mandates that all mineral 
enterprises must pay a royalty, independently of its profits, based on the gross value of 
the mineral resource extracted.
26
 The use of funds is also restricted to infrastructure 
projects. The criteria for distribution are similar to those of the general canon (table 5.26). 
 
                                                          
26
 The rate applied is 1 percent over the first US$60 million, 2 percent for the values between US$60 and 
US$120 million, and 3 percent for gross values over US$120 million. 
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Table 5.26 Distribution Criteria for Mineral Royalties 
Share 
(%) 
Beneficiaries Distribution Criteria for 
Governments at the Same Level 
20 District municipality where the mine is located (of 
which 50% to the community where the mine is 
located) 
 
20 Municipalities in the province According to population and index 
of unmet basic needs
a 
40 Municipalities in the region According to population and index 
of unmet basic needs 
15 Regional government  
5 Universities  
Source: MEF. 
Note: a. The index of unmet basic needs measures the percentage of the population with at least one basic 
need that has not been satisfied. The basic needs considered in the index are electricity, water, and 
sewerage services. 
 
Table 5.27 presents the evolution of revenues and basic statistics for canon revenues for 
provincial and district municipalities for 2004 and 2008. The figures convey the 
explosive increase in revenues from extractive industries and also their variability in the 
most recent years. Ten departments—in descending order of increase, they are 
Cajamarca, Cusco, Moquegua, Tacna, Loreto, Piura, Puno, Ucayali, Arequipa, and 
Ancash—receive over 90 percent of canon revenues. 
 
Table 5.27 Variability of Provincial and District Revenues from Extractive Industries, 2004 
and 2008 (in nuevos soles per capita) 
 2004 2008 
 Provinces  Districts Provinces Districts  
     
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 1,265.6 2,383.6 24,072.6 29,003.5 
     (province) Purús) Lobitos Lucumba Ilabaya 
     
Simple average 51.3 57.3 397.6 423.2 
Weighted average 8.3 17.4 44.5 134.1 
Standard deviation 128.0 129.1 1,762.2 1,257.0 
Coefficient of variation
a
 15.3 7.4 39.6 9.4 
(max. - min.)/average 151.6 137.0 541.5 216.2 
     
   
     
Source: Own computations based on MEF data. 
Note: a. The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the weighted average. 
 
Issues with the canon 
Originally, the canon was conceived of as just another source of financing for subnational 
governments, without any idea of what much higher international prices could mean for 
subnational financing and horizontal disparities—the unwanted consequences of the 
canon.  
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The sharing of revenues from natural resources among different levels of government is a 
complex issue. Neither the specialized literature nor international practice provides clear 
guidelines for the best allocation and sharing of these revenues.
27
 Although some issues 
of economic efficiency are involved (see Cyan 2010), the assignment of property rights 
over natural resources is generally solved in different ways reflecting the political, 
cultural, and historical perspectives of each country. Of course, different choices carry 
different consequences. A generally accepted economic argument for allocating at least 
some of these resources under a geographic criterion is to compensate local residents for 
the pollution and environmental damage associated with the extraction of the natural 
resources. But how much this compensation should be is generally left open. In Peru, the 
dominant criterion appears to have been one based on the property rights of subnational 
governments.
28
 
 
The sharing of sizable revenues on an origin (or derivation) basis generally leads to 
potentially large horizontal fiscal disparities, because the location of natural resources is 
not necessarily well correlated with the relative expenditure needs or fiscal capacities of 
the beneficiary governments. Even if the distribution criterion is defined over common 
determinants of expenditure needs like the population and unmet basic needs, as is 
partially the case in Peru, the problem of horizontal imbalances remains between 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. Also of note is the size of the canon transfers; for 
example, the maximum per capita transfers received by a province in 2008 from 
extractive industries (Lucumba) was 25 times greater than the maximum per capita 
transfers from the FONCOMUN (the province of Lamud). This ratio reaches a value of 
17 when comparing maximum transfers to districts, with Ilabaya receiving the greatest 
amount from extractive industries and San José de Ushua receiving the greatest amount 
from FONCOMUN (table 5.26). These fiscal disparities have become a large issue in 
Peru especially because, so far, there are no effective mechanisms to reduce the 
distortions imposed in the system.
29
 
 
In international practice, it is generally suggested that those subnational governments 
benefiting from the canon-like transfers generally have lower incentives to develop their 
own tax administrations or to spend resources efficiently. A 2010 World Bank report 
finds lower levels of expenditure efficiency in subnational governments benefiting from 
canon resources.
30
 This can also have negative effects on the tax effort of subnational 
governments excluded from canon revenues, which may look to further central transfers 
                                                          
27
 See Bahl and Tumennasan (2002) and Searle (2007) for discussions of the issues and international 
practice. 
28
 See, for example, Bahl and Tumennasan (2002). 
29
 For example, in March 2007 the Assembly of Regional Presidents petitioned the central government for a 
share of 10 percent on all canon revenues for those regions currently receiving no funds. See “Asamblea de 
Presidentes Regionales propone Agenda Descentralista,” Poder Ciudadano, edición 93; 
www.poderciudadano.org.pe/?p=658. 
30
 The efficiency of public expenditures at the provincial municipality level is derived by dividing a 
composite of several performance indexes by expenditures. The results show significant differences across 
regions not only in performance but also in efficiency. Local governments in wealthier regions perform 
better but are not necessarily more efficient. Larger shares of locally collected revenues are associated with 
higher performance and efficiency (World Bank 2010). 
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to alleviate their financing imbalances. Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Sepúlveda (2011), however, do not find that the canon transfers actually lead to lower tax 
effort by the municipalities receiving them.
31
 Beyond the potential lower levels of 
expenditure efficiency, the canon has also been the likely source of large unspent cash 
balances at the local level.
32
 
 
Another concern regarding the canon has been the potential loss of macroeconomic 
control by the central authorities. Since the central authorities are not able by law to alter 
the amount of these transfers (although they have been able to impose certain conditions 
on their use), we can infer that, at any time, a fairly volatile 10 percent of the general 
government budget can follow policy directions that diverge significantly from those 
designed by the central government 
 
A final controversial issue with the canon is that current law stipulates that these funds be 
spent on infrastructure (allowing in some cases the use of 20 percent of the funds for 
maintenance purposes).
33
 This has created considerable bottlenecks in spending budgets, 
which have been followed by pressure from the central authorities and criticism from the 
national media for faster disbursement of the funds. All this has potentially led to 
inefficient expenditures (see World Bank 2010). 
 
The FONCOMUN and other local transfers 
 
The Municipal Compensation Fund (FONCOMUN) is a conventional equalization 
transfer program, established well before the current decentralization process in 1994 by 
Legislative Decree No. 776 (the Law of Municipal Taxation). The FONCOMUN is 
financed with the municipal promotion tax (impuesto de promoción municipal), which 
consists of a surtax rate of up to 2 percent applied over the value-added tax, plus other 
minor resources. According to the 1994 law, the distribution of the FONCOMUN should 
be based on “equity” and “compensation” criteria, and the transfer should “ensure the 
functioning of all municipalities.” More recently, Law 29332 of 2009 and Supreme 
Decree 060-2010 introduced “managerial performance” as an additional criterion in the 
distribution formula. 
 
Box 5.5 summarizes the formula currently used to distribute the available FONCOMUN 
funds among municipalities. In the first stage, the transfer fund is allocated to the 
provincial municipalities in proportion to their “unmet basic needs” weighted by their 
                                                          
31
 Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda (2011) also review previous studies with 
fundamentally the same fiding.  
32
 For several years, those local authorities have been the subject of criticism and pressure from the central 
authorities to disburse those balances. But, clearly, those pressures have been somewhat contradictory to 
the need to increase the efficiency of local expenditures, which can be expected to take some time and 
preparation.  
33
 The Supreme Audit Institution (Contraloría General de la República) is charged with monitoring the 
proper use of the canon and other funds. 
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population.
34
 In the second stage, the provincial municipalities get to keep 20 percent of 
the funds received in the first stage. The remaining 80 percent is distributed among the 
district municipalities within the province in accordance with three factors: (a) 
population, (b) managerial performance, and (c) land area. The most important of these 
factors is population, with a weight of 85 percent, and where rural population is assumed 
to have twice the expenditure needs of urban population. The next factor in importance is 
managerial performance, which is defined in terms of the rate of growth of per capita 
own revenue collections and the share of transfers from FONCOMUN that is spent on 
capital infrastructure. In the third stage, the amounts of transfers are adjusted so that all 
municipalities receive at least a minimum transfer equivalent to 8 monthly Tributary Tax 
Unit (UITs).
35
  
 
The FONCOMUN is the most important component of municipal revenues for many 
municipalities in Peru, both in terms of its relative magnitude and its compensating 
function. Table 5.28 presents the variability of FONCOMUN transfers among provincial 
and district municipalities in 2004 and 2008. As a first approximation to the equalization 
(lack of) power of the FONCOMUN, note that the FONCOMUN transfers are 
significantly less variable than transfers from the canon and that the largest per capita 
transfer from the canon in 2008 was 17 times larger than the largest per capita transfers 
from the FONCOMUN. 
 
Box 5.5 FONCOMUN Distribution Formula 
 
                                                          
34
 This is an index that includes measures of need of households including poor housing quality, crowding 
in homes, lack of sewerage disposal, children not attending school, and shortage of food. 
35
 The UIT is a legal monetary unit whose value since 2010 has been 3,600 nuevos soles (US$1,283 as of 
December 31, 2010). 
Stage 1: Geographic distribution to province j: 
 
Stage 2: Distribution to municipalities: 
 
Provincial 
Municipality 
District Municipalities: 
   0.85 × [Urban Pop + 2 × Rural Pop] 
   + 0.10 × [managerial performance] 
   + 0.05 × [size in km2] 
 
20% 80% 
Stage 3: Adjustments to ensure a minimum transfer of 8 (monthly) UITs to each municipality 
Source: Based on SD 156-2004 and SD 060-2010. 
 Fiscal Decentralization in Peru: A Perspective on Recent Developments and Future Challenges 49 
 
 
 
Table 5.28 Variability of Province and District Revenues Per Capita from FONCOMUN, 
2004 and 2008 (in nuevos soles) 
 2004 2008 
 Provinces Districts Provinces Districts 
     
Minimum 22.7 0.0 44.7 7.4 
Maximum 1,037.5 1,662.6 954.7 1,691.9 
     (district) Iñapari Curibaya Lamud San José de Ushua 
     
Simple average 161.3 165.0 260.1 198.2 
Weighted average 25.7 37.3 46.6 66.4 
Standard deviation 116.3 167.0 152.9 154.5 
Coefficient of variation
a
 4.5 4.5 3.3 2.3 
(max. - min.)/average 39.5 44.5 19.5 25.4 
     
 
  
     
Source: Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda 2011. 
Note: a. The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the weighted average. 
 
More specifically, FONCOMUN transfers do little to compensate for the disparities 
caused by the canon transfers. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the canon 
transfers and the FONCOMUN transfers was zero for provincial municipalities and close 
to zero (0.02) for district municipalities in 2008. A perfect offset between these two types 
of transfers would have been indicated by a correlation coefficient of -1.0. The actual 
correlation coefficients imply that the allocation of the canon and other revenues from 
extractive industries are in practice independent from the expenditure needs at the local 
level (as approximated by the FONCOMUN formula). 
 
The absolute size of the revenues received by the municipalities from the extractive 
industries is significantly greater than at the regional level. The total amount of revenues 
received from extractive industries by municipalities during 2008 was 5.145 billion 
nuevos soles. This is over three times the 1.669 billion nuevos soles in revenues received 
by the regional governments from the same source. Accordingly, we can anticipate that 
the disparities and other distortions imposed by the canon may be larger at the local level. 
Note, also, that the transfers allocated through the FONCOMUN reached 3.257 billion 
nuevos soles during 2008, an amount almost five times larger than the funds distributed 
by the FONCOR (the capital equalization grant) at the regional level. 
 
Besides the FONCOMUN, there are several other central transfers to local governments 
generally implementing national programs at the local level. One such transfer is the 
Vaso de Leche program, which pursues nutrition standards for infants and lactating 
mothers. These transfers tend to be highly correlated with the FONCOMUN transfers. 
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Issues with the FONCOMUN 
 
A first issue with the FONCOMUN is that the FONCOMUN is not as equalizing as it 
could or should be. In particular, its formula considers a number of proxies for 
expenditure needs, but it does not offer any adjustment for differences in the fiscal 
capacity of municipal governments. The result is that under the current system all 
municipalities, even those that already have abundant fiscal resources from the canon, 
receive a certain amount of transfer. The funds in the FONCOMUN could have a much 
bigger equalizing effect if they were used to support those municipalities with low fiscal 
capacity. 
 
The same argument serves to identify a second issue with the current distribution 
procedure. If some municipalities have their own fiscal capacity to finance their 
expenditure needs, then the minimum transfer they receive could be used with a greater 
equalizing effect if they were provided with zero FONCOMUN funds and those funds 
were allocated to municipalities with lower fiscal capacity.  
 
A third issue is that the allocation in two stages, first to the province and later to the 
districts, can result in undesirable changes in the final allocations to the districts. For 
example, two identical districts that belong to different provinces, depending on the 
provinces’ characteristics, could receive quite different per capita transfers even though 
their expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are the same. 
  
The FONCOR and other regional transfers 
 
The Regional Equalization Fund (Fondo de Compensación Regional, FONCOR) was 
introduced in the 2002 Law on the Bases of Decentralization. Its funding was anticipated 
to come from all the public investment projects at the regional level plus 30 percent of the 
net proceeds from any privatization and concession projects realized by the central 
government. The FONCOR was distributed to the regions until 2009 according to an 
index formula elaborated by the MEF on the basis of the following variables: 
 
 Population 
 Poverty 
 Unmet basic needs 
 Location near borders 
 Effectiveness in the execution of investment projects. 
 
In 2009, through Ministerial Resolution No. 322-2009-EF-15, the General Directorate of 
Economic and Social Affairs introduced a new methodology to compute the FONCOR 
transfers, which should significantly improve its equalizing power. Under the new 
methodology, the aforementioned factors are used to compute the capital expenditure 
needs of each regional government, and then the net capital expenditure needs are 
obtained by subtracting from this amount the revenues received from canon, sobrecanon, 
royalties, and custom duties. Finally, the transfer is distributed proportionally among 
those regional governments with positive net capital expenditure needs. As a result, those 
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governments for which the revenues from extractive industries exceed their capital 
expenditure needs receive no transfers from the FONCOR, and the available resources 
can be concentrated exclusively on the regions where there is not enough funding for 
capital expenditures.
36
 
 
This reform was designed to be implemented gradually over three years, and provides a 
suggestive mechanism for reducing the distortions imposed by the revenues from 
extractive industries and enhancing equity and efficiency in the system of subnational 
government finances in Peru. Indeed, what this reform has done is simply to introduce in 
the equalization transfer formula an adjustment for fiscal capacity,
37
 a component that the 
municipal equalization transfer, the FONCOMUN, still lacks. 
 
The Socioenonomic Development Fund of the Camisea Project
38
 (Fondo de Desarrollo 
Socioeconómico del Proyecto Camisea, FOCAM) was created by Law No. 28451 of 
2004 with the goal of financing investment projects and socioeconomic infrastructure of 
the regional and municipal governments in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Ica, and Lima, and 
research in the universities of these regions. The funds can also finance the development 
of biodiversity, renewable energies, and health projects in the area of Camisea. The 
funding comes from 25 percent of the royalties received by the central government from 
the exploitation of the related Camisea gas fields and pipelines. The allocation formula is 
presented in table 5.29. 
 
Table 5.29 FOCAM Allocation Criteria 
Share 
(%) 
Beneficiaries 
Distribution Criteria 
for Governments the Same Level 
30 Regional governments Based on population, unmet basic needs, and length of 
pipelines 
30 Provincial municipalities Based on population, unmet basic needs, and length of  
pipelines 
15 District municipalities (with 
pipeline presence) 
Based on population, unmet basic needs, and length of  
pipelines 
15 District municipalities (without 
pipeline presence) 
Based on population and unmet basic needs 
10 Public universities Equal shares 
Source: MEF 2006. 
                                                          
36
 The current weights for the distribution factors are 51 percent for population, 43 precent for unmet basic 
needs, 3 percent for population at international borders, and 3 percent for effectiveness in investment 
budget execution. Even though the last two factors might not be good determinants of expenditure needs, 
they account for only 6 percent of the computation, leaving 94 percent to population and unmet basic 
needs, which are more adequate proxies for needs. 
37
 Gómez, Martinez-Vazquez,
 
and Sepúlveda (2009a,b) propose and illustrate this type of adjustment for 
the FONCOMUN and FONCOR in Peru. 
38
The Camisea Project consists of the construction and operation of two pipelines for natural gas and 
natural gas liquids from the Camisea fields in the region (Department) of Cuzco and traverses the 
Ayacucho, Huancavelica, lca, and Lima departments, reaching Lima 431 kilometers away. 
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The Fund for the Promotion of Regional and Local Public Investment (Fondo de 
Promoción a la Inversión Pública Regional y Local, FONIPREL) was introduced by Law 
No. 28939) of 2007, Ley que establece la implementación y el funcionamiento del Fondo 
de Promoción a la Inversión Pública Regional y Local. FONIPREL is a competitive fund 
to provide matching funds for public investment projects at the regional and local levels 
with the goal of reducing the existing gap in service delivery and infrastructure. The 
funds are allocated where the impact is the reduction of poverty and extreme poverty. In 
2008, the central government funded FONIPREL with 143.9 million nuevos soles, of 
which only 19.2 million went to regional governments and the rest to local governments.  
 
Table 5.30 shows the evolution of FOCAM, FONCOR, and FONIPREL during 2004–09 
and compares it to that of the canon at the regional level. While the FONCOR and the 
canon represented fairly equivalent levels of funding in 2004, the fast growth of the 
canon has significantly dwarfed FONCOR and the other capital transfers at the regional 
level. But while the FONCOR and FONIPREL have a national scope, the canon is 
concentrated only in those regions with mineral deposits. The same is true for FOCAM. 
 
Table 5.30 Evolution of Capital Transfers to Regional Governments, 2004–09 
(millions of nuevos soles) 
Source 2004 %  2005 %  2006 %  2007 % 
2008
a 
%  2009 
% Ings. 
GRs 
 Mineral canon  
106.
6 6.5 
218.
6 9.7 
440.
9 
13.
9 
1,29
1.2 
22.
4 
969.
6 
13.
7 
933.
1 12.4 
 Gas canon  18.2 1.1 79.8 3.5 98.6 3.1 
156.
1 2.7 
188.
2 2.7 
193.
2 2.6 
 Hydropower canon  25.8 1.6 27.1 1.2 32.3 1.0 37.3 0.6 28.1 0.4 36.1 0.5 
 Fishing canon 10.0 0.6 7.3 0.3 12.8 0.4 10.5 0.2 14.6 0.2 16.0 0.2 
 Forest canon 0.2 0.0 46.0 2.0 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Oil canon  
134.
7 8.2 
173.
2 7.7 
212.
0 6.7 
217.
3 3.8 
279.
9 4.0 
135.
6 1.8 
 Oil sobrecanon  54.8 3.3 59.8 2.7 69.4 2.2 57.1 1.0 85.2 1.2 54.8 0.7 
Total Canon and 
Sobrecanon 
350.
3 
21.
2 
611.
7 
27.
1 
867.
4 
27.
3 
1,77
1.1 
30.
7 
1,56
6.5 
22.
1 
1,36
8.7 18.1 
Mineral royalties 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.3 1.8 72.7 1.3 65.6 0.9 52.6 0.7 
FONCOR 
360.
3 
21.
8 
428.
4 
19.
0 
430.
0 
13.
6 
702.
5 
12.
2 
673.
7 9.5  0.0 
FOCAM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.6 1.0 34.0 0.6 36.4 0.5 58.0 0.8 
FONIPREL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 0.2 69.0 0.9 
Other capital transfers 19.0 1.2 45.5 2.0 
116.
0 3.7 
351.
2 6.1 
221.
4 3.1 
789.
7 10.5 
             
Total Capital 
Transfers 
729.
7 
44.
2 
1,08
5.5 
48.
1 
1,50
2.4 
47.
3 
2,93
1.6 
50.
8 
2,57
4.4 
36.
4 
2,33
8.0 31.0 
Total  
1,64
9.0 
100
.0 
2,25
5.1 
100
.0 
3,17
2.9 
100
.0 
5,77
2.7 
100
.0 
7,07
6.0 
100
.0 
7,54
4.0 100.0 
Source: MEF. 
Note: Data on FONCOR not available for 2009. 
a. Revenues only through September. 
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To illustrate the variability in regional transfers, table 5.31 presents the basic statistics for 
the distribution of the regional canon and the FONCOR across regional governments for 
2004 and 2008. In 2004, the amounts of revenue distributed from both sources were quite 
similar; however, the maximum per capita transfers from extractive industries 
(corresponding to the region of Loreto) almost doubled the maximum amount provided 
by the FONCOR (to the region of Moquegua). The greater concentration of revenues 
from extractive industries in fewer regional governments is confirmed by the two 
measures of variability, the coefficient of variation and the range between minimum and 
maximum per capita transfers over the (weighted) average, which are much higher for 
this source of revenue. Similar results are obtained for 2008, but the differences between 
the maximum per capita revenues and the variability are even more pronounced. Tacna, a 
region rich in mining resources, received four times more revenue from the canon than 
Apurimac, the region that most benefited from the FONCOR. 
 
Even though FONCOR transfers are meant to be used only for capital investment 
purposes and related expenses, the potential fungibility of money within the budgets is, at 
least in principle, likely to allow for a fairly effective equalizing effect across regions. 
However, the greater magnitude and variability of revenues from the canon vis-à-vis the 
FONCOR suggests that the equalizing potential of the latter may be significantly limited. 
Moreover, assuming that the FONCOR incorporates factors in the distribution formula 
that are related to expenditure needs, the fact that the correlation between the FONCOR 
and the regional canon was close to zero in 2004 and quite small in 2008 implies that the 
revenues from extractive industries are independent from expenditure needs. 
 
Table 5.31 Variability of Regional Revenues from Extractive Industries and FONCOR, 
2004 and 2008 (in nuevos soles per capita) 
 2004 2008 
 
Extractive 
Industries 
FONCOR 
Extractive 
Industries 
FONCOR 
     
Minimum 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.4 
Maximum 118.4 65.4 647.3 134.3 
     (region) Loreto Moquegua Tacna Apurimac 
     
Simple average 21.3 24.5 101.0 43.1 
Weighted average 13.3 13.7 60.0 24.2 
Standard deviation 32.3 18.0 153.5 39.5 
Coefficient of variation
a
 2.4 1.3 2.6 1.6 
(max - min)/average 8.9 4.7 10.8 5.5 
     
Correlation: -0.02 -0.28 
     
Source: Own computations based on MEF data. 
Note: a. The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the weighted average.  
 
Issues with regional transfers 
 
Issues with regional transfers include the following. 
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Presence of sharp fiscal disparities. There is wide agreement in Peru that the current 
system of capital transfers, including the canon, generates large disparities in the 
financing of regional governments.
39
 Beyond the obvious issue of equity that this 
situation raises, these disparities can lead to lower efficiency of public spending and 
inefficient migration patterns. 
 
Table 5.32 presents the evolution of per capita total revenues for regional governments 
during 2004–09. Even though per capita revenues have increased in all regions, the data 
also clearly show significant disparities among the 25 regions. For example, in 2009 the 
regional government of Huánuco had revenues of 69 nuevos soles per capita, far less than 
the national average of 471 nuevos soles. By comparison, the same year, the regional 
government of Moquegua had revenues of 2,107 nuevos soles per capita (or 4.7 times the 
national average and 30.5 times the per capita revenues in Huánuco). Also note that the 
disparities have been increasing, with the coefficient of variation almost doubling over 
the period, which is clearly related to the evolution of canon revenues. Because of the 
reforms introduced to the FONCOR in 2009, we would expect to see the disparities in 
table 5.32 to be somewhat smaller. However, more recent data were unavailable. 
 
Table 5.32 Per Capita Total Revenues at the Regional Level, 2004–09a 
(in nuevos soles) 
Region 
(Department) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
b 
2009 
Amazonas 75 91 97 207 333 184 
Ancash 64 69 183 1,004 1,282 1,615 
Apurímac 86 85 113 129 214 118 
Arequipa 82 96 128 201 357 438 
Ayacucho 85 126 155 189 183 157 
Cajamarca 69 129 200 227 195 305 
Callao 194 241 285 314 317 322 
Cusco 70 139 223 418 491 472 
Huancavelica 121 200 188 340 336 224 
Huánuco 60 66 74 108 123 69 
Ica 58 66 92 155 104 146 
Junín 57 60 78 124 141 129 
La Libertad 71 91 108 175 213 228 
Lambayeque 46 43 101 139 146 100 
Lima 21 39 63 155 232 215 
Loreto 188 246 249 320 371 358 
Madre de Dios 108 120 157 211 557 629 
Moquegua 187 534 1,063 2,100 2,140 2,107 
Pasco 101 124 273 604 551 706 
Piura 85 100 113 134 176 158 
Puno 60 67 84 132 169 196 
San Martín 89 90 160 356 405 249 
Tacna 133 391 689 1,381 1,730 1,543 
Tumbes 168 229 268 307 377 518 
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 See, for example, Herrera (2008); and García and Monge (2008). 
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Ucayali 215 238 238 219 587 586 
Minimum 21 39 63 108 104 69 
 Lima Lima Lima Huánuco Ica Huánuco 
Maximum 215 534 1,063 2,100 2,140 2,107 
 Ucayali Moquegua Moquegua Moquegua Moquegua Moquegua 
Standard deviation 52.3 115.8 216.9 461.9 506.3 521.7 
Simple Average 100 147 215 386 469 471 
Coefficient of 
variation 0.52 0.79 1.01 1.20 1.08 0.90 
(max. - min.)/Reg. 
Av. 2.3 4.3 6.2 6.9 5.8 4.3 
Source: MEF. 
Note: a. Per capita averages correspond to 2007 with population figures from the 2007 Census; for prior 
years, population is approximated by interpolation between the 1993 Census and the 2007 Census. 2009 
population projected based on estimates from the “CIA Factbook” (July 2011). b. Only through September. 
 
Inability of the FONCOR and other regional transfers to offset the unequalizing 
impact of the regional canon. The FONCOR and the FONIPREL are clearly structured 
as equalization grants, even though the competitive nature of the FONIPREL could 
constrain its equalization effects.
40
 Even the FOCAM, exclusively allocated to regions 
where the gas pipelines are located, distributes the funds considering “unmet basic 
needs,” among other criteria. In contrast, the resources from the canon and other 
extractive activities are simply allocated by the geographic location of mineral deposits, 
even though the distribution criteria among the related jurisdictions use variables for 
relative poverty and unmet basic needs.  
 
Unfortunately, the analysis of the overall impact of capital transfers at the regional level 
cannot be conducted with data after 2009. The evidence available before the reforms of 
the FONCOR in 2009 is that regional transfers may not reduce fiscal disparities but 
actually increase them along several dimensions. From the simple correlation coefficients 
presented in table 5.33 we can see that capital transfers are highly positively correlated 
with the canon transfers. We can also see that the measures of per capita revenues (total, 
capital transfers, and the canon) are negatively correlated with the incidence of poverty 
and the index of unmet basic needs. Therefore, public resources are less concentrated in 
regions with higher expenditure needs, at least measured along those two dimensions.
41
 
Since both poverty and the index of unmet basic needs are part of the allocation formulas 
for capital transfers, the results partly suggest that the derivation geographic principle 
used for the canon more than offsets the impact of the poverty and unmet basic needs 
criteria. 
 
Overall, other transfers reinforce canon transfers in increasing disparities in capital total 
revenues. Whether transfers are or are not overall equalizing depends on the variables 
selected as benchmarks. As shown in table 5.33, transfers (including the canon) are not 
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 Basically, poorer jurisdictions may be less able to prepare competitive projects. 
41
 The fact that the incidence of poverty and the index of unmet basic needs are highly correlated suggets 
that those regions with a greater number of needy people are also the regions with greater needs for capital 
infrastructure. 
56 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
equalizing in that they tend to go to regions with less poverty and fewer unmet basic 
needs. However, transfers (including the canon) may be seen as equalizing in that they 
tend to go to regions with lower regional GDP per capita. This latter result is likely 
driven by the fact that metropolitan Lima, which has high regional GDP per capita, is not 
at all a big recipient of transfers (including the canon). 
 
Table 5.33 Simple Correlation Coefficients between Per Capita Tranfers and Measures of 
Income and Need at the Regional Level in 2007 
 
Regional 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Per Capita 
Total 
Revenues 
Per 
Capita 
Capital 
Transfers 
Per Capita 
Canon 
Transfers 
Poverty 
Incidence 
Índex of 
Unmet 
Basic 
Needs 
       
Regional GDP Per Capita  1.00      
Per Capita Total Revenues -0.15 1.00     
Per Capita Capital Transfers  -0.23 0.96 1.00    
Per Capita Canon Transfers  -0.25 0.96 0.98 1.00   
Poverty Incidence  -0.07 -0.30 -0.22 -0.27 1.00  
Index of Unmet Basic Needs -0.09 -0.31 -0.15 -0.25 0.90 1.00 
       
Source: Gómez, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda 2009. 
 
 
6. Borrowing 
 
Current legislative framework 
 
Subnational governments in Peru are allowed to borrow under a fairly conservative set of 
rules. Subnational government borrowing is regulated by the Fiscal Responsibility and 
Transparency Law (Ley de Responsabilidad y Transparencia Fiscal), Law 27.958 of 
2003, and the Fiscal Decentralization Law (Decree No. 955). 
 
Two general rules apply: 
 
 The “golden rule” that borrowed funds can only be used to finance public 
investments, never current spending 
 Prior central government permission is necessary for any foreign borrowing. 
 
The other current rules include the following: 
 
 Limits on debt service: the ratio of servicing the debt without central goverment 
guarantee cannot exceed 10 percent of current revenues, the ratio of total debt 
services to current revenues cannot exceed 25 percent, and short-term debt cannot 
exceed 8.33 percent of current revenues. 
 Limits on total debt levels: the ratio of total debt without central government 
guarantee to current revenues cannot exceed 40 percent, and that of total debt to 
current revenues cannot exceed 100 percent. 
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 Limits on the growth of public spending: the real rate of growth of nonfinancial 
expenditure cannot exceed 3 percent per year. 
 The requirement that the average primary balance for the last three years cannot 
be negative. 
 Borrowing restrictions (with some exceptions) during the year before general 
elections stated in terms of expenditure limits and budget outcomes. 
 
The MEF is responsible for the supervision of subnational government borrowing and for 
enforcing the existing rules. Compliance with rules as reported by the MEF is mixed. The 
rule on short-term borrowing and the rule on limits on nonfinancial spending are broken 
by most subnational governments. There are also some compliance problems with the 
rule on “average primary balance” and the rule related to the “limit on total debt without 
central government guarantee.” In fact, many local governments have a ratio of short-
term debt in excess of 8.33 percent of current revenues. There is little information on the 
size of the so-called “floating debt.” A few local governments are actually in virtual 
bankruptcy, with total debt over six times their current revenues. The current regulatory 
framework does not provide for mechanisms to correct debt imbalances or bankruptcy 
procedures. 
 
Financial administrative capacity is generally quite low among subnational governments, 
which has limited their access to credit markets. In reality, there are just a handful of 
subnational governments that have had access to credit markets. The relatively low level 
of subnational credit likely reflects, at least on the demand side, a combination of a 
generalized lack of financial administrative capacity and the current conservative 
regulatory framework. Most municipalities borrow from the central bank (Banco de la 
Nación). The central bank, in coordination with the Treasury (Dirección Nacional de 
Tesoro Público), is in charge of channeling all intergovernmental transfers. This has 
allowed the central bank to introduce an intercept on the transfers to subnational 
governments to ensure repayment of their debt. 
 
Table 5.34 presents the total debt of regional and local governments aggregated at the 
regional (department) level at the end of 2009. This total debt of regional and local 
governments as of December 2009 represented 16.8 percent of total subnational revenues 
and 1.9 percent of GDP.  In table 5.34, total debt is broken down into three categories: 
 
 Internal debt, which includes debt to the central bank, commercial banks, and the 
Ministry of Housing and Public Works (Ministerio de Vivienda, Construcción y 
Saneamiento) 
 External debt, including with foreign financial and nonfinancial institutions 
 “Other obligations,” which includes debt to the Social Security Administration 
(Oficina Nacional Previsional), the National Tax Administration 
(Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria), and the National 
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Health Insurance (El Seguro Social de Salud del Perú) and Pension Fund 
Administration (Administradoras de Fondo de Pensiones del Perú) agencies.
42
 
 
The main component by far (over three-fourths) is from “other obligations,” largely 
representing arrears in payments by subnational governments to central government 
agencies, including payments for retirement and health insurance of employees, and 
payments to the central tax administration.  International debt represents 17 percent of the 
total. The totality of international debt is held by Lima.
43
 The municipality of Lima is 
actually the largest debtor, holding around half of the total debt. Note that regional 
governments represent barely 2 percent of the total debt of subnational governments. The 
rest of the subnational total debt outstanding corresponds to the municipalities. 
 
Table 5.34 Total Debt of Regional and Local Governments per Type of Debt as of December 
31, 2009 (in nuevos soles, based on information provided by lenders) 
Department Internal Debt External Debt  
Other 
Obligations 
Total 
Amazonas 6,343,041 0 6,180,484.37 12,523,526 
Ancash 4,172,830 0 98,980,349.26 103,153,179 
Apurímac 5,064,993 0 4,595,001.64 9,659,995 
Arequipa 3,857,271 0 147,700,844.23 151,558,115 
Ayacucho 9,184,861 0 15,503,328.35 24,688,190 
Cajamarca 24,673,496 0 25,738,907.00 50,412,403 
Prov. Constitucional del Callao 21,183,122 0 329,262,612.64 350,445,734 
Cusco 20,119,329 0 9,264,439.13 29,383,768 
Huancavelica 15,581,934 0 4,618,884.59 20,200,818 
Huánuco 9,442,182 0 22,001,437.45 31,443,619 
Ica 1,944,120 0 129,144,814.28 131,088,934 
Junín 7,836,115 0 8,420,585.70 16,256,700 
La Libertad 3,605,851 0 65,026,499.60 68,632,351 
Lambayeque 7,410,056 0 312,317,286.66 319,727,343 
Lima 321,636,163 206,958,587 1,042,163,709.63 1,570,758,460 
Loreto 34,670,141 0 36,411,930.16 71,082,071 
Madre de Dios 717,120 0 6,482,315.50 7,199,436 
Moquegua 518,010 0 410,952.10 928,962 
Pasco 1,798,556 0 11,278,384.82 13,076,941 
Piura 11,062,350 0 91,298,911.25 102,361,262 
Puno 14,216,442 0 16,511,595.42 30,728,038 
San Martín 9,964,682 0 20,595,857.20 30,560,540 
Tacna 1,671,418 0 6,085,655.20 7,757,073 
Tumbes 1,871,112 0 40,312,768.86 42,183,881 
Ucayali 15,292,083 0 22,776,419.04 38,068,502 
Total 553,837,279 206,958,587 2,473,083,974 3,233,879,840 
Source: Portal of Transparencia Económica, MEF. 
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 The “floating debt” amounts are not included in the figures in table 34. 
43
 A few other subnational governments (for example, Lambayeque) have incurred foreign debt but have 
done so through the central government.  
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Issues related to borrowing 
Issues related to borrowing include the following. 
Despite relatively low levels of debt, there are some troublesome patterns. In terms of 
the nature of the subnational debt, it is notable that much of what is owed by local 
governments (67.7 percent in 2008) corresponds to “other obligations” including overdue 
payments for social security of employees, and suspended payments to the National Tax 
Administration, with the corresponding finance charges. That is all debt to the central 
government. In contrast, the debt to financial institutions, private or public, appears to be 
repaid on a timely basis. Thus, the behavior of local governments would seem to reveal 
an attempt to operate with a soft budget constraint vis-à-vis the central government.  
 
Another source of troublesome issues is the so called “floating”—or provisional—“debt” 
that local governments hold. This is fundamentally budget arrears with employee wages 
and benefits. This type of debt is not well monitored at the central level.  
 
Lack of integration and incongruencies in some of the fiscal rules. It is clear that 
subnational governments in Peru require a regulatory borrowing framework for fiscal 
responsibility and for helping maintain macroeconomic stability.
44
 Beyond the issue of 
whether the current regulatory borrowing framework may be too conservative, there are 
possibilities for simplifying and improving the internal consistency of the framework. In 
particular, there appear to be inconsistencies in how the objective of limiting total debt is 
pursued by the different rules. An example is in the interaction of the rule concerning the 
limit on total debt service and the rule limiting short-term debt. Given that debt service is 
one of the components of short-term debt, the limit imposed on debt service (defined in 
terms of net current revenues) should be smaller than the short-term debt limit. This is 
because short-term debt, besides debt service, includes an obligation to the National 
Treasury, bank drafts, accounts payable, and other obligations. To be adequately 
complementary, the limit on short-term debt should be higher than the 25 percent of net 
current revenues now allocated to total debt service; or alternatively, the limit on debt 
service should be smaller than the 8.33 percent of net current revenues now required for 
short-term debt.  It would appear that the issue is not so much with the limit imposed on 
total debt service but with the conservative limits imposed on short-term debt.  
 
The congruence of the limits to subnational public spending growth and other central 
government policies. Even though it is clearly undesirable to have explosive growth in 
public spending, there appears to be a contradiction between the recent policies of the 
central government encouraging subnational spending on capital infrastructure, sustained 
by increased capital transfers, and the 3 percent limit on overall subnational spending 
growth. The growth in spending would be especially undesirable if it led to budget 
                                                          
44
 There are different approaches to promoting responsible borrowing in international practice. Approaches 
that rely on third-party pressure, such as credit ratings or mutual peer pressure, tend to be more effective 
than approaches that rely on rules and regulations (see Vulovic 2011). However, for the current institutional 
setup in Peru, with the lack of development of credit markets and vertical dialog and cooperation, a rule-
based approach is likely the most attractive option.  
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imbalance. However, the past growth in subnational spending has been based on 
subnational revenue increases. Furthermore, there is already a rule requiring nonnegative 
primary budget balance. Therefore, the need for the rule limiting subnational spending 
growth can be questioned. 
 
Is there a need to differentiate between guaranteed and nonguaranteed total debt 
ceilings? The distinction between these two types of debt may not be justified. The vast 
majority of subnational governments do not have access to foreign borrowing, which by 
law requires central government prior permission and guarantee. Even though a central 
government guarantee in the case of domestic borrowing may be required by a lending 
institution, in practice, this has been a very rare exception. In addition, it is questionable 
whether nonguaranteed debt is in effect riskier than guaranteed debt. The existing 
procedures for public investment already seem to have adequate safeguards for capital 
projects funded with or without debt guarantees. Also consider the following: (a) central 
government guarantees may add moral hazard issues, since lenders may be less watchful 
of lending to subnational governments precisely because of the central government 
guarantee; and (b) guaranteed foreign debt is subject to foreign exchange risk and, 
therefore, it may be reasonable to argue the need to be more conservative in this case.  
 
Thus, it would seem possible and desirable to simplify the current borrowing regulatory 
framework by eliminating the separate requirement for guaranteed and nonguaranteed 
debt (for total debt ceiling and debt service). This would line up Peru’s regulatory 
framework with international practice.  
 
The special case of the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima. The Metropolitan 
Municipality of Lima is currently the only subnational government in Peru with complete 
access to domestic and foreign credit markets. For this reason, Lima is subject to ongoing 
additional monitoring and control of budget finances and debt sustainability by the 
lenders and credit rating agencies. All this may justify not less central government 
monitoring, but some degree of asymmetry with less strict borrowing limits for all 
subnational governments (regions and provincial municipalities) that, like Lima, can 
develop better access to credit markets and become subject to monitoring and controls by 
third parties beyond the central authorities. 
 
Overall, even though there are problems with arrears to central government institutions 
and employee benefits and wages and compliance with some of the debt rules, for the 
most part subnational governments in Peru operate within a hard budget constraint, and 
current debt levels are manageable.   
 
 
7. Policy Reform Options  
 
Policy reform options for the different elements of the decentralization framework in 
Peru are discussed below. The emphasis is on laying out “sensible” reforms to improve 
the quality of the decentralization framework, but we have no elements to judge how 
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feasible, or even desirable, these reforms are within the overall strategy of the new 
administration of President Ollanta Humala.   
 
Policy reform options regarding the vertical structure of government  
 
Addressing the fragmentation at the municipal level. The high level of local government 
fragmentation remains an important problem in Peru, a problem shared with many other 
countries around the world. Hence, it is useful to consider how other countries have tried 
to address this problem. Internationally, the problem of fragmentation has been addressed 
through two general approaches. One approach has been to implement the forced 
amalgamation of local governments. Another approach has been to seek either the 
voluntary amalgamation or the voluntary association of local governments without a loss 
of their identity. Forced amalgamation has not always delivered cost economies because 
of political difficulties with firing workers and the administrative need to level salaries 
typically at the highest existing levels. Furthermore, economies of scale in service 
delivery, with the exception of a few services requiring large amounts of infrastructure, 
can be attained at relatively low population sizes (between 10,000 and 20,000 
inhabitants).
45
 In addition, the forced amalgamation process must also consider the 
potential cost of lower levels of representation and accountability associated with this 
approach. The pursuit of voluntary consolidation programs typically has not worked in 
international experience despite the role played by financial incentives. Typically, these 
incentives are not large and, therefore, they are not attractive. In addition, the size of the 
incentives needs to be limited by sustainability. They should not exceed the transaction 
and administration costs of implementing the amalgamation program. 
 
To consider either forced or voluntary amalgamation, it will be necessary to evaluate the 
potential for cost savings from economies of scale on a case-by-case basis. To do this 
well, it will be necessary to have clear assignments of responsibilities and to consider 
alternative ways to achieve those efficiencies, including the constraints imposed by 
public employment regulations regarding downsizing personnel and making salary 
adjustments. This will require information that is not currently available and a scope of 
work that goes well beyond that of this chapter. 
 
In international practice, there are other alternative strategies that have been used to 
address local fragmentation including: 
 
 The privatization of public services 
 The creation of special districts that can cover the provision of a particular service 
in several jurisdictions taking advantage of economies of scale 
 Local government cooperation through the creation of associations.46 
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 See Gomez and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) for a discussion of the available evidence on the existence of 
economies of scale in the delivery of different types of public services. 
46
 A great advantage of interjurisdictional cooperation is that it allows even the smallest local governments 
access to capital equipment and technologies that they otherwise could never afford (Martinez-Vazquez
 
and 
Gómez 2008). 
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All three approaches can work, but their feasibility and effectiveness depend on the 
particular country, institutional setting, and history. Local government cooperation 
through the creation of associations appears to be the chosen formula in Peru. The new 
Law on Municipal Associations (Ley de Mancomunidades) and its regulations provide an 
adequate framework to promote those associations except for a few issues. One area 
where the Law on Municipal Associations can be improved is in extending municipal 
cooperation beyond public infrastructure projects. Clearly, the provision of current 
services can also be improved via cooperation. A second area for improvement is that 
cooperation must not be limited to situations of equal roles and responsibilities for all 
parties involved. It should also include situations where smaller municipalities may 
contract with larger neighboring municipalities for the delivery of certain services.
47
 
 
The current law and regulations on municipal cooperation in “mancomunidades” 
provides a solid basis for solving many of the problems related to municipal 
fragmentation in Peru, but the law should shift the emphasis from cooperation on 
infrastructure projects to cooperation on improvements in public service delivery. 
 
Addressing the impasse of the macroregions. The unrealized national aspiration to 
develop macroregions still threatens to hold hostage many other important aspects of the 
decentralization process in Peru. In the short and medium term, there is a need to rethink 
the issue of the macroregions in view of the failed referendums. It would seem that, in 
practice, the decentralization process at the regional level has gone forward, and that is 
the right thing to do through the further devolution of expenditure responsibilities as 
specified in the Organic Law on Regional Governments. Revenue decentralization still 
has a long way to go, although there have been improvements on the side of transfers. It 
would seem that fuller devolution to the regional governments on the expenditure and 
revenue sides is the right thing to do even though the scale of the regional governments 
may be far from ideal. However, there is more to lose by staying still or waiting for the 
problematic or the never-arriving approval of the macroregions. 
 
In the longer term, it would help to clarify the objectives of any future territorial reform 
at the regional level and recognize more explicitly the existing tradeoff between cost 
efficiencies and better representation. As in the case of municipalities, the consolidation 
of the current departments into a smaller number of regions has the potential to create 
efficiencies by reducing average cost and administrative burdens. But relatively smaller 
jurisdictions also offer the advantage of better matching the needs and preferences of 
residents and greater accountability. Coming from a long period of centralism, citizens in 
Peru may more greatly value having better representation and more accountability than 
taking advantage of potential economies of scale in service delivery. One way to interpret 
the failed referendum on the macroregions is that Peruvian citizens appear to put more 
value on having a greater voice in the government system, aided by smaller governments 
that are closer to the voters, than on the potential increased efficiencies arising from 
larger regional governments. 
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 See Herrero, Martinez-Vazquez, and Murillo (2008) for an extensive discussion and set of 
recommendations on how to increase the potential for interjurisdictional cooperation in Peru.  
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Advancing in the boundary demarcation of subnational governments. The demarcation 
of boundaries for regional and local governments needs to advance faster, since clear 
demarcation is a precondition for a well-functioning system of decentralized finance. 
Even though geographic demarcation can be hard to implement, especially when there 
are issues of location of natural resources, the central authorities need to substantially 
increase the resources available to the National Directorate of Territorial Demarcation to 
get this task done. 
 
Policy reform options in expenditure assignments  
 
Clarification of expenditure assignments. A clear assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities is a necessary condition for conducting any estimation of expenditure 
needs of regional and local governments and for debating the proper financing systems 
for both levels of government. There is, therefore, a need to pursue further clarification of 
expenditure responsibilities at the three levels of government by amending the current 
matrix developed by the National Office for Decentralization (Secretaria Nacional de la 
Descentralización). The lack of clarity and transparency in assignments can lead to 
inequitable outcomes and threatens the operational efficiency in service delivery due to 
either the duplication or underprovision of services (with different levels blaming each 
other for not providing the service), eventually diminishing the overall level of 
accountability to citizens. 
 
More specifically, the expenditure assignment matrix would need to be updated to 
include: 
 
 The assignment of responsibilities for financing the different functions 
 Further clarification of the assignment of concurrent responsibilities by 
progressively disaggregating subfunctions to the point that it will be possible to 
identify what level of government is exclusively responsible for the subfunction 
in a completely transparent way 
 The elimination of overlapping responsibilities between regional and local 
government 
 Providing subnational governments with the authority to design and regulate in 
some sectoral areas 
 Clearly assigning responsibilities for financing the different aspects of concurrent 
responsibilities. 
 
It is important to realize that the assignment of expenditure responsibilities is a dynamic 
process that requires periodic assessments. 
 
Improving the methodologies used to approximate expenditures needs. Using historical 
costs to approximate expenditure needs is only recommendable for the transitional 
period, since this approach cannot be separated from past inefficiencies or even 
historically unfair patterns of expenditure. There are a number of alternative workable 
approaches including a weighted index of variables approximating need drivers or top-
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down per-client financial standards adjusted for differences in the cost of provision. A 
bottom-up approach to costing standard packages of services is also viable but less 
recommendable because of the time and cost requirements and the fact that it can easily 
lead to unaffordable financial requirements.
48
 
 
The measurement of expenditure needs should be conducted separately for regional, 
provincial, municipality, and district municipality governments since they all have 
different assignments of expenditure responsibilities. The estimation of expenditure needs 
will facilitate the reform of revenue assignments in the transfer systems at different 
levels. Some recent estimates of expenditure needs using the methodologies described 
above strongly suggest that the distribution of expenditure needs is much more uniform 
than the actual distribution of expenditures, which are led by the availability of financing, 
in particular from canon revenues (see Gómez, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda 
(2009a,b). 
 
Increased coordination and collaboration among different levels for concurrent 
responsibilities. The lack of coordination among the different levels of government can 
lead, in the case of concurrent responsibilities, to the duplication of services or a failure 
to provide adequate levels of service. Institutional reforms leading to adequate 
coordination and dialogue among the different levels of government should be a priority.  
 
At the central-regional level, there is a need to clearly delineate the roles of 
deconcentrated units of the central government and to make them a separate permanent 
establishment from the “regional directorates.” Further, the regional directorates should 
be fully integrated into the regional governments, giving regional authorities full power 
over their budgets. The spending interests of the central government on the different 
sectoral areas can be protected by using conditional grant instruments to finance the 
regional governments. Beyond that, there is a need to create permanent coordinating 
committees by sectoral area between the central line ministries and agencies and the 
regional governments, which should meet on a periodic basis to discuss issues of 
coordination and potential conflict between the two levels of government. Bilateral 
negotiations between the central authorities and regional governments should be avoided 
unless they are issue specific, because they tend to lack transparency and can give rise to 
perceptions of favoritism. They are also more expensive for the central authorities to 
hold.  
 
Similar permanent coordinating committees should be established at the regional level for 
the dialogue and coordination between regional and local authorities in the main areas 
where there are concurrent responsibilities. 
 
Addressing the resolution of conflicts in expenditure assignments. Conflict is likely to 
arise even when mechanisms for coordination and collaboration are in place. As the 
process of devolution of functions deepens, it can be expected that conflicts in the 
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and Boex (2007) for 
extended discussions of these approaches. 
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interpretation of expenditure assignments will continue to rise. The Constitutional Court 
should work as the last instance for conflict resolution after other avenues have been 
exhausted. Conflicts among government levels should be first addressed by mixed 
sectoral committees with representation of the central and regional governments. At a 
second stage, unsolved issues could be addressed formally (as is now done informally) in 
the meetings of the national president and regional presidents. If the conflict is among 
municipalities in the same region, this second stage could consist of the mediation of the 
regional authorities (for example, the regional president). If the conflict is between 
regional and municipal governments, the mediation could be entrusted to the prime 
minister. At a third stage, this issue could be considered by administrative courts or even 
by the Administrative Bench (Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo) of the Supreme 
Court, and then, finally, it could be considered by the Constitutional Court. 
 
Fully integrating the regional directorates into the regional governments. The de facto 
double subordination of the regional directorates to the regional government and to the 
line ministries undermines the autonomy of regional governments and the expected gains 
from decentralization. Formally, there has been some progress made by having the 
regional presidents appoint the heads of the regional directorates. Now what is needed is 
a way to unlock the budgets of the regional directorates such that autonomy to prioritize 
expenditure is given to the regional governments while protecting the fundamental 
interests of the central government.
49
 
 
To implement this reform, it will be necessary to clearly differentiate in the now so-called 
“deconcentrated expenditures” of regional budgets between what are true “delegated” 
functions from the central government, which should be financed by conditional 
transfers, and what are truly decentralized functions for which the regional governments 
should freely decide, and which should be financed by own revenues, unconditional 
transfers, or both. After the distinction between delegated and own functions is made, 
attention needs to be given to the design of the conditional transfers, which should allow 
the financing of minimum standards of service (defined nationally) without 
micromanagement from the center of how those funds are used. 
 
Regarding the fees and charges currently accruing to the “regional directorates,” even 
though the concept and practice of a single treasury account at the regional level is 
desirable for good cash management, its extension to all sources of revenues, in particular 
fees and charges, is not always desirable or even justified. Retaining those revenues for 
stimulating increased service quality and accountability among executing units can be 
well justified. Breaking the link between fees and charges and the executing agency can 
affect the ability to provide more and better services. Thus, a compromise needs to be 
                                                          
49
 The lack of administrative capacity of regional governments cannot be used as an argument against 
providing them with more autonomy in dealing with their budgets. After all, through the long process of 
certification and transfers of responsibilities to the regional governments, the central authorities have stated 
that the regional governments already have the material and human means to efficiently manage those 
public services. 
66 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
reached at the regional level on what fees and charges can reasonably be kept by the 
executing agencies to improve service delivery. 
 
Reforming expenditure assignments will also require taking decisions over the next 
decade involving (a) the overall level of expenditure responsibility for subnational 
governments, (b) whether local and regional governments should be given more 
autonomy in particular functions, and (c) whether the balance in expenditure 
responsibility between regional and local governments should be modified. These are 
decisions that can only be made by the current and future administrations.  
 
Policy reform options in revenue assignments 
 
Reforming revenue assignments in Peru will require the implementation of several 
coordinated initiatives.  
 
At the local level, the general poor revenue performance of provincial and district 
municipalities suggests the need to address the problem from both policy and 
administration perspectives. In particular, the property tax on land and buildings and the 
property transfer tax are currently assigned to the district municipalities. Given the lack 
of administrative capacity of many of these local governments, it is necessary to consider 
the reassignment of these taxes at the provincial municipality level. Provincial 
municipalities may be expected to have technical and financial advantages for the 
administration, collection, and enforcement of these taxes. Because the tax on the 
property of vehicles is comparatively easier to administer, this tax now assigned to the 
provincial municipalities could be reassigned at the district municipality level. However, 
this logical switch in assignments would not be revenue-neutral by any means. So the 
reassignment would require some degree of revenue sharing in property taxes between 
provincial and district municipalities, or finding another tax assignment substitute to at 
least hold district municipalities harmless, if not with the same degree of (potential) 
revenue autonomy. 
 
From an administration perspective, the general lack of technical and administrative 
capacity at the subnational levels calls for a more active role on the part of the central 
authorities in developing the skills and equipment required to collect taxes. The positive 
experiences of the semiautonomous Tax Administration Service (SAT) offices in a small 
number of cities suggest that there is room for improvement on the administration side, 
and although the SATs’ experience is not likely to be replicable in many municipalities, it 
clearly shows the significant returns that can be obtained from improving tax 
administration capacity at the local level.  
 
At the regional level, the story is completely different since, until now, regional 
governments have not been assigned any autonomous revenue sources and depend 
completely on central government transfers. Here, then, reform can start from zero. 
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In reforming revenue assignments at the subnational level in Peru, there needs to be the 
clear objective of significantly increasing revenue autonomy to end up with a fiscal 
decentralization system that is more accountable and fiscally responsible.  
 
More specifically, the options for reform in revenue assignments include the following. 
 
Reorganization of municipal revenue assignment. Provincial governments are currently 
assigned the tax on vehicle property, which requires relatively low administrative 
capacity and spending, while districts are assigned the property tax, which is 
characterized by complex and expensive procedures. Given that administrative, technical, 
and financial capacities at the provincial level are, on average, significantly superior to 
the capacities of district governments, it might be reasonable to consider a switch in the 
assignment of these tax instruments, provided that the revenue issues discussed above are 
also addressed. 
 
Consider an asymmetric decentralization of tax administration at the municipal level. 
Tax administration and tax collections could be assigned only to those local governments 
that have the means to administer and enforce the collection of their assigned tax 
instruments. Upper levels of government might temporarily play a subsidiary role by 
assuming functions that cannot be satisfactorily carried out by certain lower-level 
governments like, for example, the the valuation function for the property tax; but in 
some cases it might be reasonable to think about a permanent assignment of some of 
these functions to the higher level. Other asymmetric options in tax assignment reform 
may be considered. For example, Lima could be given additional tax autonomy vis-à-vis 
the rest of the regions on the grounds of its level of development and larger expenditure 
needs and fiscal capacity. However, all asymmetric treatments carry positive and 
negative discrimination aspects among jurisdictions, and this may make them less 
politically feasible. 
 
Invest in capacity building at the municipal level and subsidize initial investments in 
revenue collection capacity. The capacity to administer and collect taxes can be built, but 
many subnational governments in Peru lack the expertise and resources to reach 
minimum standards of efficiency. Lower levels of government might need technical and 
financial assistance from upper levels of government in developing their tax 
administration and tax collection capacity. Subsidizing initial investments covers many 
aspects. For example, in the case of the property tax, the central government could 
assume the responsibility for developing and maintaining the cadastre of properties at the 
national level for a given period of time. Once the cadastre has been developed, the 
responsibility of maintaining it can be devolved again to lower levels of government. 
Other arrangements are possible, including the asymmetric responsibility for the cadastre 
assigned to provincial municipalities in their territory, but assigned to the regional 
government in the case of the cadasters for the district municipalites.  
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At the regional level, consider the following alternatives for creating revenue 
autonomy: 
 
 Implementation of piggyback or “flexible” revenue sharing schedules over central 
government taxes. Regional governments could be given discretion within a range 
of tax rates on central tax revenues. A good alternative is the labor (wage and 
professional) income tax, which is paid by those individuals who directly benefit 
from regional expenditures. The revenues that can potentially be collected may 
not be substantial in many cases with respect to total regional outlays, but this 
limitation also allows for a wider range of discretion, which could contribute to 
fostering revenue autonomy and accountability. 
 Implementation of “fixed” revenue sharing schedules over local government 
taxes. A potential alternative to increase revenue autonomy at the regional level is 
the sharing—with some discretion in rates—the municipal property tax and the 
property transfer tax. However, in this case, any regional discretion over tax rates 
might hurt the already limited revenue autonomy of local governments. The 
participation of regional governments in local tax collection might also promote 
the involvement of regional authorities in the development of local revenue 
collection capacity and the control of its performance. 
 Introduction of other new taxes at the regional level. There are not many good 
options here, but two possible candidates include business license taxes (such as 
Colombia’s Industry and Commerce Tax or Chile’s Patente) and excise taxes on 
the consumption of electricity and phone services. 
 
The introduction of any new sources of tax revenues is likely to lead to increases in 
revenue disparities. Therefore, newly increased revenue autonomy may require the 
strengthening of the system of equalization transfers. 
 
Policy reform options in the transfer systems 
 
At the local level, the following policy reform options are offered. 
 
Modification of the distribution criteria of the canon or transfers from extractive 
industries. Ideally, the distribution of transfers from extractive industries, currently based 
on a derivation principle, should be changed to other criteria that also consider the 
expenditure needs, and especially the fiscal capacity, of local governments. In practice, 
however, such a reform might not be attainable due to the strong political opposition of 
the current beneficiaries to any tinkering with the system. For this reason, we suggest an 
indirect approach to reduce the distortionary and inequitable effects of those transfers, 
based on a possible—we believe more feasible—reform to the FONCOMUN. 
 
Reforming the FONCOMUN. The general goal for this reform should be to strengthen 
the equalizing power of the FONCOMUN transfer. This can be accomplished by first 
changing the distribution criteria in the formula in order to internalize the availability of 
funds from the canon, and second by strengthening its equalization impact by increasing 
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the overall pool of funds available for distribution. In particular, the reform of the 
FONCOMUN would involve the following steps: 
 
 Introduction of a fiscal capacity measure into the FONCOMUN formula. This 
reform would allow for partial correction of the inequalities and inefficiencies 
created by the revenues from extractive industries or canon. Of course, the 
consideration of canon transfers as part of the fiscal capacity of local governments 
may be opposed by current beneficiaries of these transfers. But this type of reform 
may be politically more viable than the direct reform of the canon transfers. 
Recently, the Peruvian government introduced a similar reform to the FONCOR 
at the regional level. The new factor, entering negatively in the FONCOR 
formula, is the amount of transfers from the canon received by the regional 
governments. This is a good precedent that a similar reform may work at the local 
level with the reform of the FONCOMUN formula. 
 Elimination of the minimum transfers of 8 monthly UITs. The reformed 
measurement of fiscal disparity would consider the ability of a government to 
finance its expenditure needs. If the fiscal disparities were negative, then the 
government would require no additional resources to cover its expenditure needs. 
In this context, the minimum transfer would be unnecessary and those resources 
could instead be used to support other governments in greater need. This measure 
would increase the equalizing power of the FONCOMUN. 
 Separation of the FONCOMUN into different provincial and district municipality 
components. The procedure by which the transfer fund is first distributed to 
provinces and then to the districts is unnecessarily complex and leads to 
undesirable inequalities. For example, two identical district municipalities 
requiring the same financial support might receive different amounts of transfers 
only because they belong to different provinces. The system would gain in 
transparency and fairness by assigning a share of the fund to the provinces, and 
the rest to all districts in the country in accordance with their relative fiscal 
disparities. The apportionment of available funds between provincial 
municipalities and district municipalities could be based on the relative sizes of 
the aggregate fiscal gaps (the difference between expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity) at the two levels. 
 Increasing the size of the pool of funds available for the FONCOMUN. It is 
unlikely that offsetting the disparities introduced by the canon would be possible 
without an increase in the pool of funds available for the FONCOMUN. More 
actively pursuing the goal of reducing geographic fiscal disparities will require 
enlarging the pool of funds available for the FONCOMUN. Of course, this 
increase will depend critically on the chosen criteria for equalization and, 
therefore, the overall offset of the disparities introduced by the canon transfers. 
 
At the regional level, the following policy reform options are offered. 
 
Modification of the distribution criteria of the canon or transfers from extractive 
industries. Again, as in the case of local governments, ideally, the distribution of 
transfers from extractive industries exclusively based on the geographic location of the 
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natural resources should be changed to include other criteria that also consider the 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of regional governments. It is unlikely, however, 
that central government authorities would be willing to accept the political costs this 
reform would bring. Here again, as in the case of local governments, we suggest an 
indirect approach to offset the impact of the canon on the equity and efficiency of 
regional public service provision. The good news is that the recent reform of the 
FONCOR has already moved the system in the right direction. 
 
Creation of a new unconditional equalization transfer program for recurrent budgets 
to complement the equalization impact of the FONCOR for capital expenditures. The 
implementation of regional revenue autonomy and revenue sharing schemes would most 
likely create additional horizontal imbalances that could be counterbalanced by additional 
equalization transfers. One possible strategy is to increase the funds that are distributed 
by the FONCOR, but this transfer is currently mainly focused on capital expenditures. 
The alternative solution is to create a new unconditional equalization transfer program 
equalizing current expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. No net additional resources 
would be needed if a share of the funds now transferred as “ordinary resources” (which 
are distributed in accordance with historical spending) are redirected to fund the new 
equalization transfer at the regional level. 
 
Simplify and increase the transparency of the FONCOR. The current distribution 
formula for the FONCOR includes an equalization criterion providing larger transfers to 
those regional governments that benefit less from the canon and other resources from 
extractive industries. However, the distribution formula for the FONCOR is excessively 
complex and practically impossible to replicate by the regional governments themselves. 
Therefore, there is a need to increase the transparency of the formula, simplifying it and 
even increasing its equalization power. The latter is important because, at present, the 
overall distribution of capital transfers to regional governments (including the canon, the 
FONCOR, and other minor transfers) is still not equalizing. 
 
Introducing conditional grants. As the “regional directorates” get regularized and fully 
incorporated into the regional governments, part of the funds now allocated through the 
“ordinary resources” could be assigned to funding new conditional grants to finance the 
new delegated responsibilities to the regional governments in areas such as education and 
health.  
 
Policy reform options in borrowing 
 
The following policy reform options in borrowing are offered. 
 
Simplify and increase the flexibility and transparency of the fiscal (borrowing) rules. 
Even though there is no ideal blueprint to regulate subnational borrowing, borrowing 
regulations in Peru need to be less constraining, less complex, and more transparent. 
 
Simplification can be achieved by eliminating the rules limiting the growth in real 
nonfinancial spending, the rule limiting the total debt without central government 
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guarantee, and the rule limiting the service of the debt without central government 
guarantee. Imposing limits on total debt and on debt service (applied equally to centrally 
guaranteed and not guaranteed debt) is all that should be required. Flexibility and 
transparency can be gained by increasing the limit on short-term debt at least above the 
limit applied to debt service. It will also be desirable to consider laxer rules in terms of 
total debt and debt service for a top group of subnational governments with larger 
borrowing and administrative capacity, such as the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima. 
But in this case, it would be necessary to have explicit rules for how to qualify for the 
“preference” group. 
 
Improve reporting and data gathering. Although there have been significant 
improvements in data reporting by lender institutions, the data reporting by many local 
jurisdictions is still incomplete and unsatisfactory. For example, there is currently little 
information on the debt held by local jurisdictions through their corporations and public 
enterprises. There also continues to be spotty reporting on the budget arrears (the 
“floating debt”). 
 
Consider updating current sanctions for lack of compliance with borrowing rules. The 
Law on Fiscal Prudence and Transparency states that, in cases of lack of compliance with 
borrowing rules, subnational governments can be sanctioned with restrictions to their 
access to particular transfers by the MEF. It may be desirable to update these provisions 
taking into account the following factors: 
 
 It may be desirable to differentiate among cases of sustained lack of compliance 
from single incidents created by external causes. Thus, it would be desirable to 
introduce protocols giving subnational governments the chance to straighten out 
their finances.  
 It is desirable to try to avoid punishing the residents of any jurisdiction for the 
behavior of public officials they are supposed to represent. In this sense, it may be 
desirable to adopt the French and Spanish approach of fining public officials 
personally after the opportunity is given to them to rectify the situation. 
 In cases of persistent lack of compliance, it might be desirable to have an 
appointed receivership (preferably by a court of justice) in charge of managing the 
subnational jurisdiction finances until the compliance issues are fully addressed. 
 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
Even though fiscal decentralization is a relatively new phenomenon in Peru, the country 
has made significant progress. Over the last decade, Peru has developed a comprehensive 
legal framework involving the four pillars of fiscal decentralization (expenditure 
assignments, revenue assignments, transfers, and borrowing).  
 
Despite that progress, significant challenges remain. These challenges can be grouped 
into two main categories according to their degree of difficulty.  
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There will be significant political constraints to reforming certain aspects of the 
intergovernmental fiscal system. In the “hard to deal with” category, we clearly find two 
main issues: 
 
 How, at the regional level, to move beyond the formation of macroregions by the 
amalgamation of the existing regions or departments 
 How to undo the important negative consequences of the canon system. 
 
Having been soundly rejected in public referendums, the constitution of the macroregions 
should not continue to hold hostage the evolution of the decentralization process at the 
regional level. Even though the scale of current regions and departments may be less than 
ideal, the reform process and updating of the four fiscal decentralization legs should 
proceed at full speed for the regional governments. 
 
The most desirable way to address the unwanted consequences of the canon, which has 
created significant horizontal and vertical fiscal disparities in the system, would be to 
reform the canon laws. However, this direct approach is likely to be politically infeasible 
even for the new administration, given the political and social turmoil that has surrounded 
canon issues in the past. The approach recommended here is to address this issue 
indirectly but still effectively by reforming the existing transfer system in order to offset 
the effects of the canon. In particular, at the local level, this can done by reforming the 
FONCOMUN equalization transfers to include in its formula an explicit measure of fiscal 
capacity. This would virtually deprive local governments now relatively much richer 
because of canon funds from receiving FONCOMUN funds. Including better measures of 
expenditure needs in the formula for the FONCOMUN should also help alleviate existing 
disparities. How effective these reforms will be will depend on the pool of resources left 
for the equalization fund; therefore, the issue of funding should also be considered as part 
of the reform. 
 
One remaining question concerns the political feasibility of this reform, or how local 
governments that may be excluded from the FONCOMUN in the future will react. The 
recent reform of the regional capital equalization fund, FONCOR, along the same lines 
suggested here for the FONCOMUN, sets a hopeful precedent. However, the unlikely 
event of a significant decline in commodity prices could make it less urgent to address 
the “unwanted consequences” of the canon. 
 
In the “easier to deal with” category, this chapter has identified a rather long list of issues 
and has offered potential options for their reform.  
 
Much remains to be done in addressing the fragmentation and lack of administrative 
capacity of local governments, especially of district municipalities. Here, the central 
government has started on the good path of supporting and encouraging the formation of 
local government associations, the “mancomunidades.” However, there will be a need to 
reorient this effort toward general service provision and not only infrastructure, and to 
allow service contracts among larger and smaller municipalities. In addition, much more 
effort will be needed in capacity building. 
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There is still a considerable lack of clarity on expenditure assignments at the different 
levels of government. Building on the work already done, this is an area where fast 
progress can be made. Other aspects of expenditure assignments that need attention 
include the final push to convert the currently deconcentrated functions at the regional 
level into truly decentralized functions. This will require bringing the budgets of the 
regional directorates fully under the authority of the regional governments and partially 
converting the “ordinary funds” into conditional grants to finance the newly delegated 
functions. Other aspects of expenditure assignment reform include the building of a 
transparent methodology to estimate expenditure needs of regional and local governments 
derived from their expenditure responsibilities. Improvement in the coordination and 
dialogue among the different levels of governments will significantly help solve 
interpretation and practical issues in concurrent responsibilities. 
 
Revenue assignments are in relatively good shape at the local level, but they need to be 
done from scratch at the regional level. The longer-term health of the decentralization 
system in Peru, in terms of expenditure efficiency, accountability, and fiscal 
responsibility, will depend largely on the effective degree of tax autonomy among local 
and regional governments. The taxes assigned at the local level, the property tax and the 
tax on vehicles, are good choices to provide revenue autonomy. But perhaps that list 
could be enlarged and those two taxes reassigned so that the property tax is collected by 
the provincial municipalities, since generally they have better administrative capacity 
than the district municipalities. However, several revenue issues would need to be 
addressed and revenue effort considerably increased. At the regional level, this chapter 
has suggested several possibilities for new tax assignments including using a piggyback 
flat personal income tax on the national personal income tax. 
 
The hardest reforms in the current transfer system involve better integration of the canon 
and the equalization transfers. This chapter has offered specific steps for how this can be 
accomplished. A final set of issues concerns the simplification and greater transparency 
of borrowing regulations. Although this is an area that poses no immediate concrete 
threat, there is considerable room for simplification and improvement of reporting and 
information gathering. A second-generation concern will be how to improve access to 
private credit markets for those subnational governments that have sufficient 
administrative and fiscal capacities. 
 
Peru has arrived at a stage where the question is no longer whether to decentralize, but 
rather what form of decentralization to adopt. This chapter provides a blueprint for 
achieving a more efficient and equitable decentralization system in the country. 
74 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
Bibliography 
 
Abelson, P. 1981. “The Role and Size of Local Government Authorities in New South 
Wales.” Occasional Paper No. 19, Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations, Australian National University, Canberra. 
“Abriendo espacios fiscales: la descentralización de fuentes de ingresos y el desarrollo de 
la capacidad recaudatoria de los Gobiernos Regionales y Municipales en Perú.” 
2010. Prepared for the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Government of Peru, 
Corporación Andina de Fomento and Georgia State University. 
Aguilar, Giovanna, and Rosa Morales. 2005. “Las transferencias intergubernamentales, el 
esfuerzo fiscal y el nivel de actividad.” Documento de Trabajo. Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos, Lima. 
Ahlbrandt, Jr., R. 1973. “Efficiency in the Provision of Fire Services.” Public Choice 16 
(3): 1–16. 
Ahmad, Ehtisham, and Giorgio Brosio. 2008. “Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax 
Assignments in Latin American Countries: Earmarked Revenue versus Tax 
Autonomy.” IMF Working Paper WP/08/71, International Monetary Fund, 
Wahsington, DC. 
Ahmad, Ehtisham, and Mercedes García-Escribano. 2006. “Fiscal Decentralization and 
Public Subnational Financial Management in Peru.” IMF Working Paper 
WP/06/120, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
———. 2011. “Constraints to Effective Fiscal Decentralization in Peru.” In 
Decentralization in Developing Countries: Global Perspectives on the Obstacles 
to Fiscal Devolution, ed. J. Martinez-Vazquez and F. Vaillancourt. Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar.  
Albala-Bertrand, J. M., and E. C. Mamatzakis. 2004. “The Impact of Public Infrastructure 
on the Productivity of the Chilean Economy.” Review of Development Economics 
8 (2): 266–78. 
Alfaro, Javier, and Markus Rühling. 2007. “La Incidencia de los Gobiernos Locales en el 
Impuesto Predial en el Perú.” Instituto de Investigación y Capacitación Municipal, 
Lima. 
Alonzo Gutiérrez, R. 2006. “La cooperación intermunicipal en Guatemala: un perfil de 
nuevas formas de gestión del desarrollo local.” Revista Pueblos y Fronteras 
Digital 1: 1–16. 
Alt, J. 1971. “Some Social and Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures.” 
British Journal of Political Science 1 (1): 49–62. 
Altschuler, B. 2003. “El asociativismo municipal como estrategia para el desarrollo 
económico en la Argentina.” V Seminario de Redmuni, Mendoza, Argentina, 10 
de septiembre. 
Alvarado, Betty, Brenda Rivera, Janet Porras, and Allan Vigil. 2003. “Transferencias 
Intergubernamentales en las Finanzas Municipales del Perú.” Universidad del 
Pacífico. Lima. 
Alvarez, X., M. Caride, and X. Gonzalez. 2003. “La gestion del servicio de recogida de 
basura en los ayuntamientos gallegos.” Revista Galega de Economia 12 (2): 1–37. 
 Fiscal Decentralization in Peru: A Perspective on Recent Developments and Future Challenges 75 
 
 
Aragón, Fernando, and Vilma Gayoso. 2005. “Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal 
Effort in Peruvian Local Governments.” Munich Personal RePEc Archive 
(MPRA) Paper No. 2108, RePEc (Research Papers in Economics), Munich. 
Bahl, Roy, and Bayar Tumennasan. 2002. “How Should Revenues from Natural 
Resources be Shared?” International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta. 
Bahl, Roy, and Johannes Linn. 1992. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bahl, Roy, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Joan Youngman. 2008. “The Property Tax in 
Practice.” In Making the Property Tax Work: Experiences in Developing and 
Transitional Countries, ed. Roy Bahl, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and 
JoanYoungman. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policies. 
Bazargan, M., and B. Vasigh. 2003. “Size versus Efficiency: A Case Study of US 
Commercial Airports.” Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (3): 187–93. 
Bel, G. 2005. “Un analisis de los gastos municipales por el servicio de residuos solidos 
urbanos.” Revista de Economia Aplicada 13 (38): 1–28. 
———. 2006. Economía y Política de la privatización local. Fundación Rafael del Pino, 
Madrid. 
———. 2009. “Servicios Locales, Infraestructura y Transporte: Dimension, Escala, 
Redes e Instituciones de Gobernanza.” Seminario “Descentralización y Desarrollo 
Local.” Conferedación Andina de Fomento, Lima, Peru. 
Bel, G., and M. E. Warner. 2007. “Managing Competition in City Services: The Case of 
Barcelona.” Journal of Urban Affairs 31 (5): 521–35. 
Bel, G., and M. Mur. 2009. “Intermunicipal Cooperation, Privatization and Waste 
Management Costs: Evidence from Rural Municipalities.” Waste Management 29 
(10): 2772–78. 
Bel, G., and X. Fagueda. 2008. “Local Privatization, Intermunicipal Cooperation, 
Transaction Costs and Political Interests: Evidence from Spain.” Working Papers, 
Nº 2008/04, Research Institute of Applied Economics, Barcelona. 
———. 2009. “Empirical Analysis of Solid Management Waste Costs: Some Evidence 
from Galicia, Spain.” Working Papers 2009/07, Research Institute of Applied 
Economics, Barcelona. 
Bel, G., R. Hebdon, and M. E. Warner. 2007. “Local Government Reform: Privatization 
and its Alternatives.” Local Government Studies 33 (4): 507–15. 
Berechman, J. 1983. “Costs, Economies of Scale and Factor Demand in Bus Transport: 
An Analysis.” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 17 (1): 7–24. 
Bird, Richard M. 2000. “Rethinking Subnational Taxes: A New look at Tax 
Assignment.” Tax Notes International 8: 2069–96. 
———. 2008. “Tax Assignment Revisited.” Working Paper 08-05, International Studies 
Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 
Atlanta. 
Boaden, N. 1971. Urban Policy Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bodkin, R. J., and D. W. Conklin. 1971. “Scale and Other Determinants of Municipal 
Expenditures in Ontario: A Quantitative Analysis.” International Economic 
Review 12 (October): 465–81. 
76 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
Boex, Jameson, and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. 2007. “Designing Intergovernmental 
Equalization Transfers with Imperfect Data: Concepts, Practices and Lessons.” In 
Fiscal Equalization: Challenges in the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers, 
ed. J. Martinez-Vazquez
 
and B. Searle. New York: Springer. 
Callan, S. J., and J. M. Thomas. 2001. “Economies of Scale and Scope: A Cost Analysis 
of Municipal Solid Waste Services.” Land Economics 77 (4): 548–60. 
Canavire-Bacarreza, Gustavo, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Cristian Sepúlveda. 2011. 
“Subnational Revenue Mobilization in Peru.” Report prepared for the 
“Subnational Revenue Mobilization in Latin American and Caribbean Countries” 
Research Network Project; RG-K1194, Inter-American Development Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Carr, J. B. 2004. “Perspectives on City-County Consolidation and its Alternatives.” In 
City-County Consolidation and its Alternatives: Reshaping the Local Government 
Landscape, ed. J. B. Carr and Richard C. Feiock. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 
3–25. 
Carr, J. B., K. LeRoux, and M. Shrestha. 2008. “Institutional Ties, Transaction Costs, and 
External Service Production.” Urban Affairs Review 44 (3): 403–27. 
Consejo de Europa. 2007. “Good Practices in Intermunicipal Cooperation in Europe.” 
http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/programmes_democratic_stability/imc/
IMC_Good_Practices_CDLR_Report.pdf.  
Cravacuore, D., and A. Clemente. 2006. “El proceso reciente de asociativismo 
intermunicipal en Argentina.” XI Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la 
Reforma del Estado y la Administración Pública, Ciudad de Guatemala, 7–10 de 
Noviembre. 
Cyan, Musharraf. 2010. “The Effects of Rent Assignment on Long-Lived Public Goods 
in Exhaustible Resource Economies.” Economics Dissertations. Paper 72. 
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss/72. 
Dahlby, Bev, and Leonard S. Wilson. 1994. “Fiscal Capacity, Tax Effort, and Optimal 
Equalization Grants.” The Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (3): 657–72. 
Danzinger, J. 1978. Making Budgets. London: Sage. 
De Pablos, Laura. 2009. “La Imposición Personal sobre la Riqueza y la Equidad.” 
Seminario “La Reforma de la Asignación de Impuestos a las CCAA: Desafíos y 
Oportunidades.” Santiago de Compostela. 
Deller, S. C., and E. Rudnicki. 1992. “Managerial Efficiency in Local Government: 
Implications on Jurisdictional Consolidation.” Public Choice 74 (2): 221–31. 
Díaz de Sarralde, Santiago. 2009. “La Capacidad Normativa Autonómica en la 
Imposición sobre la Renta: Posibilidades de Futuro.” Seminario “La Reforma de 
la Asignación de Impuestos a las CCAA: Desafíos y Oportunidades,” Santiago de 
Compostela. 
DiLorenzo, T. J. 1981. “The Expenditure Effects of Restricting Competition in Local 
Public Service Industries: The Case of Special Districts.” Local Government 
Studies 43 (November/December): 31–47. 
Dollery, B., and E. Fleming. 2006. “A Conceptual Note on Scale Economies, Size 
Economies and Scope Economies in Australian Local Government.” Urban 
Policy and Research 24 (2): 271–82. 
 Fiscal Decentralization in Peru: A Perspective on Recent Developments and Future Challenges 77 
 
 
Dollery, B., and L. Robotti. 2008. The Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform. 
Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Duncombe, W. D., J. Minor, and J. Ruggiero. 1995. “Potential Cost Savings from School 
District Consolidation: A Case Study of New York.” Economics of Education 
Review 14 (2): 265–84. 
Dur, R., and K. Staal. 2008. “Local Public Good Provision, Municipal Consolidation, and 
National Transfers.” Regional Science and Urban Economics 38 (2): 160–73. 
Edelman, M. A., and J. J. Knudsen. 1990. “A Classical Economies of Size Analysis on 
Average School Costs: An Iowa Case Study.” North Central Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 12 (1): 99–108. 
“El Sistema de Transferencias de Capital en Perú: Análisis y Propuestas de Reforma.” 
2009. Prepared for the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Government of Peru. 
Corporación Andina de Fomento and Georgia State University. 
Endemaño, J. M. 2008. “Asociaciones voluntarias de municipios y concejos.” 
Comunicación presentada en el “I Congreso de Pequeños Municipios y Entidades 
Locales Menores,” Logroño, 27–28 de Octubre. 
Filippini, M., and P. Prioni. 2003. “The Influence of Ownership on the Cost of Bus 
Service Provision in Switzerland—An Empirical Illustration.” Applied Economics 
35 (6): 683–90. 
Fox, W., and T. Gurley. 2006. “Will Consolidation Improve Sub-National 
Governments?” Policy Research Working Paper No. 3913, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Friz Burga, J. Z. 2008. “La Continuidad Crítica: Balance del Diseño Normativo e 
Institucional del Actual Proceso Peruano de Descentralización Política (2002–
2008).” Palestra Editores, Lima. 
García, Rocío, and Carlos Monge. 2008. “Aportes para una Propuesta de Redistribución 
de los Recursos del Canon en Cuatro Regiones del País.” DESCO-Grupo 
Propuesta Ciudadana y Revenue Watch Institute. Informe preparado para la Red 
de Municipalidades Rurales del Perú, Lima. 
Gómez, J. L. 2010. “La cooperación inter-municipal en la prestación de servicios 
públicos.” Curso de descentralización fiscal: conceptos y aplicaciones para Perú, 
Georgia State University, Marzo. 
Gómez, Juan Luis, and Cristián Sepúlveda. 2008. “El Sistema de Transferencias 
Intergubernamentales en el Perú: Una Evaluación Preliminar.” Preparado para la 
Red de Municipalidades Rurales del Perú (REMURPE), Lima. 
Gómez, Juan Luis, and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. Forthcoming. “Evidence on Economies 
of Scale in Local Service Provision: A Meta-analysis.” International Studies 
Program Working Paper. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University, Atlanta. 
Gómez, Juan Luis, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Cristián Sepúlveda. 2008. “Diagnóstico 
del Proceso de Descentralización Fiscal en Perú.” Preparado para el Ministerio de 
Finanzas, Gobierno de Perú. Corporación Andina de Fomento y Georgia State 
University. 
———. 2009a. “Las Transferencias de Nivelación: Propuestas para una Reforma del 
Sistema Peruano.” Preparado para el Ministerio de Finanzas, Gobierno de Perú. 
Corporación Andina de Fomento and Georgia State University. 
78 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
———. 2009b. “El Sistema de Transferencias de Capital en Perú: Análisis y Propuestas 
de Reforma.” Preparado para el Ministerio de Finanzas, Gobierno de Perú. 
Corporación Andina de Fomento y Georgia State University. 
———. 2010. “Abriendo Espacios Fiscales: La Descentralización de Fuentes de Ingresos 
de los Gobiernos Regionales y Municipales en Perú.” Preparado para el 
Ministerio de Finanzas, Gobierno de Perú. Corporación Andina de Fomento y 
Georgia State University. 
Gordon, N. M., and B. Knight. 2006. “The Causes of Political Integration: An 
Application to School Districts.” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 12047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Gyimah-Brempong, K. 1987. “Economies of Scale in Municipal Police Departments: The 
Case of Florida.” Review of Economics and Statistics 69 (May): 352–56. 
Herrera, Pedro. 2008. “Perú: Hacia un Sistema de Transferencias Intergubernamentales 
con Criterios de Equidad Horizontal.” Presentado en el “XX Seminario Regional 
de Política Fiscal,” Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, enero, 
http://www.eclac.cl. 
Herrero, Ana, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Encarnación Murillo. 2008. “Las 
transferencias de capital en España: Una evaluación y propuesta de reforma.” 
Working Paper, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta  
Hirsch, W. 1959. “Expenditure Implications of Metropolitan Growth and Consolidation.” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 41 (3): 232–41. 
Hunter, J. S. 1974. “Vertical Intergovernmental Financial Imbalance: A Framework for 
Evaluation.” FinanzArchiv 32 (3): 481–92. 
ICMA (International City and County Management Association). 2006. “Situación y 
análisis de la cooperación intermunicipal en Honduras.” Asociación Internacional 
de Administración de Ciudades y Condados. 
http://www.femica.org/noticias/infiorme%20nov07/Honduras%20Informe%20de
%20Pais.pdf.  
Institute of Public Affairs (IPA). 1993. Reforming Local Government in Victoria. 
Institute of Public Affairs, Melbourne. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática. 2008. “La pobreza en el Perú en el año 
2007.” Informe Técnico Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, Lima. 
InWent. 2007. “La cooperación intermunicipal en Alemania y el Perú. Compartiendo 
Experiencias.” http://www.inwent.org.pe/capacides/docs.htm  
KPMG. 1998. Reinventing Local Government in New South Wales. Sydney: Property 
Council of Australia, NSW Division. 
Krehoff, Bernd. 2008. “Tacna, Moquegua y el canon minero.” Resumen Semanal N° 
1512 de DESCO, http://www.perupolitico.com/?p=625. 
LeRoux, K., and J. B. Carr. 2007. “Explaining Local Government Cooperation on Public 
Works: Evidence from Michigan.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Western Political Science Association, Las Vegas, Nevada, March 8. 
 Fiscal Decentralization in Peru: A Perspective on Recent Developments and Future Challenges 79 
 
 
———. 2010. “Prospects for Centralizing Services in an Urban County: Evidence from 
Self-organized Networks of Eight Local Public Services.” Journal of Urban 
Affairs 32 (4):449–70. 
Llempén, Zoila, Eduardo Morón, and Cristhian Seminario. 2010. “Descentralización y 
Desempeño Fiscal a Nivel Subnacional: El caso de Perú.” In Descentralización y 
sostenibilidad fiscal subnacional: los casos de Colombia y Perú, ed. Marielle del 
Valle and Arturo Galindo. Washington, DC: Banco Inter-Americano de 
Desarrollo. 
López-Laborda, Julio. 2009. “La Descentralización de la Capacidad Normativa en el 
IVA: Problemas y Soluciones.” Seminario “La Reforma de la Asignación de 
Impuestos a las CCAA: Desafíos y Oportunidades,” Santiago de Compostela. 
Maré, M. 2007. “Taxing Consumption at the Federal and State Level: Tertium non 
datur?” COM/CTPA/ECO/GOV (2007) 6, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Paris. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J., and J. L. Gómez. 2008. “El tamaño importa: la estructura vertical 
de gobierno y la gestión del gasto público local.” Comunicación presentada en el 
Encuentro “Las Promesas y las Realidades de la Descentralización Fiscal en 
América Latina” (CAF-GSU), Lima, 4 de diciembre. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J., and M. Yao. 2009. “Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector 
Employment: A Cross-Country Analysis. Public Finance Review 37 (5): 539–71. 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge. 2001. “An Introduction to International Practices and Best 
Principles in the Design of Capital Transfers.” Working Paper, International 
Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University, Atlanta. 
———. 2007. “Revenue Assignment in the Practice of Fiscal Decentralization.” 
Working Paper 07-09, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta. 
———. 2008. “Revenue Assignments in the Practice of Fiscal Federalism.” In Fiscal 
Federalism and Political Decentralization, ed. Nuria Bosh and Jose M. Duran. 
Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar. 
———. 2010. “Local Finance in Latin America.” In Local Government Finance: The 
Challenges of the 21st Century. Barcelona: United Cities and Local Governments’ 
Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, and Andrey Timofeev. 2005. “Elección entre modelos 
centralizados y descentralizados para la administración fiscal.” En La 
financiación de las comunidades autónomas : políticas tributarias y solidaridad 
interterritorial, coord. por J. M. Durán y N. Bosch, pp. 133–88. 
———. 2007. “Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities.” Working Paper, 
International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia 
State University, Atlanta. 
———. 2010. “Choosing between Centralized and Decentralized Models of Tax 
Administration.” International Journal of Public Administration 33: 601–19. 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, and Cristián Sepúlveda. (forthcoming.) “Intergovernmental 
Transfers in Latin America: A Policy Reform Perspective.” In Decentralization 
80 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
and Reform in Latin America: Improving Intergovernmental Relations, ed. J. P. 
Jimenez and G. Brosio. Santiago, Chile: Edward Elgar and Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, and Signe Zekate. 2004. “Ukraine: Assessment of the 
Implementation of the New Formula Based Inter-Governmental Transfer 
System.” International Studies Program Working Papers 04-08, Georgia State 
University, Atlanta. 
Matas, A., and J. Raymond. 1998. “Technical Characteristics and Efficiency of Urban 
Bus Companies: The Case of Spain.” Transportation 25 (3): 243–63.  
McDavid, J. C. 2001. “Solid-waste Contracting-out, Competition, and Bidding Practices 
among Canadian Local Governments.” Canadian Public Administration 44 (1): 
1–25. 
McLure, Jr., Charles E. 1998. “The Tax Assignment Problem: Ends, Means, and 
Constraints.” Public Budgeting and Financial Management 9 (4): 652–83. 
———. 2006. “The Long Shadow of History: Sovereignty, Tax Assignment, Legislation 
and Judicial Decisions on Corporate Income Taxes in the U.S. and the E.U.” 
Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
Mehay, S. L. 1981. “The Expenditure Effects of Municipal Annexation.” Public Choice 
36 (1): 53–62. 
Melgarejo Karl, and Jean Paul Rabanal. 2006. “Perú: ¿Esfuerzo o Pereza Fiscal en los 
Gobiernos Locales?, 1999–2004.” Documentos de Trabajo DT N° 03/2006, 
Dirección General de Asuntos Económicos y Sociales, Ministerio de Economía y 
Finanzas, Perú. 
Molina, C. H., M. D. Ego Aguirre, M. Chiriboga, y V. A. Terrazas. 2007. “Las 
mancomunidades municipales y las estrategias para la revalorización de los 
territorios rurales pobres y marginados en América Latina.” Grupo Chorlaví, 
http://www.grupochorlavi.org/mancomunidades/SINTESIS%20TEMATICA.pdf.  
Morón, Eduardo, and Cynthia Sanborn. 2006. “The Pitfalls of Policymaking in Peru: 
Actors, Institutions and Rules of the Game.” Research Network Working Paper 
#R-511, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC. 
Musgrave, Richard. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Musgrave, Richard, and Peggy Musgrave. 1976. Public Finance in Theory and Practice. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Nelson, M. A. 1992. “Municipal Amalgamation and the Growth of the Local Public 
Sector in Sweden.” Journal of Regional Science 32 (1): 39–53. 
Oates, Wallace E. 1968. “The Theory of Public Finance in a Federal System. The 
Canadian Journal of Economics 1 (1): 37–54. 
———. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
———. 1993. “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development.” National Tax 
Journal 46 (2): 237–43. 
 Fiscal Decentralization in Peru: A Perspective on Recent Developments and Future Challenges 81 
 
 
———. 1999. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.”Journal of Economic Literature 37 (3): 
1120–49. 
Ostrom, E., and R. B. Parks. 1973. “Suburban Police Departments: Too Many and Too 
Small?” In The Urbanization of the Suburbs, ed. L. H. Masotti and J. K. Hadden. 
Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 367–402. 
Paddison, R. 2004. “Redrawing Local Boundaries: Deriving the Principles for Politically 
Just Procedures.” In Redrawing Local Government Boundaries: An International 
Study of Politics, Procedures and Decisions, ed. J. Meligrana. Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press. 
Pels, E., P. Nijkamp, and P. Rietveld. 2003. “Inefficiencies and Scale Economies of 
European Airport Operations.” Transportation Research: Part E: Logistics and 
Transportation Review 39 (5): 341–61. 
Quintero, R. 2005. El Asociativismo Municipal en América Latina. Quito: Federation of 
Latin American Cities, Municipalities and Associations. 
Riera, P., C. Haas, C. Amer, y V. Vilaplana. 2005. “Las mancomunidades en España.” 
Boletín de la AGE (39): 151–76. 
Rodríguez, M. 2009. “Otros Tributos Verdes: Experiencias y Posibilidades a Explorar.” 
Seminario La Reforma de la Asignación de Impuestos a las CCAA: Desafíos y 
Oportunidades, Santiago de Compostela. 
Rodríguez-Oreggia, E., y R. Tuirán Gutiérrez. 2005. “La cooperación intermunicipal en 
México. Barreras e incentivos en la probabilidad de cooperar.” Gestión y Política 
Pública XV (2): 393–409. 
Rühling, Markus. 2005. “Is there a Substitution Effect on Property Tax through Fiscal 
Transfers in Peru?” Instituto de Investigación y Capacitación Municipal, Lima. 
———. 2008. “Substitution Effect through Fiscal Transfers?! Incidence of the Peruvian 
Property Tax.” PhD Dissertation, University of Potsdam.  
Sancton, A. 2008. “Structural Reform in Canada.” In The Theory and Practice of Local 
Government Reform, ed. Brian Dollery and Lorenzo Robotti. Studies in Fiscal 
Federalism and State-local Finance. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited. 
Sepúlveda, Cristián, and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. (Forthcoming) “Explaining Property 
Tax Collections in Developing Countries: The Case of Latin America.” In 
Decentralization and Reform in Latin America: Improving Intergovernmental 
Relations, ed. J. P. Jimenez and G. Brosio. Santiago, Chile: Edward Elgar and 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Service Nova Scotia and Municipal  Relations (SNSMR). 2003. “Handbook on Inter-
municipal Partnership and Co-operation for Municipal Government.” Paper 
presented at the “Seminar on Municipal Cooperation and Partnership,” Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, November 4. 
http://www.gov.ns.ca/snsmr/muns/workshops/PDF/MunicipalCooperation_Semin
ar/Intermunicipal_report.pdf. 
Shah, Anwar. 2004. “Fiscal Decentralization in Developing and Transition Economies; 
Progress, Problems, and the Promise.” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 3282, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
82 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
Shrestha, M. 2005. “Characteristics of Service, Structure of Networks, and Forms of 
Inter-local Cooperation in Local Service Production: Evidence from Florida.” 
Paper presented at the “Creating Collaborative Communities Conference,” Wayne 
State University, Detroit, Michigan, October 31–November 1. 
Sorensen, Rune. 2006. “Local Government Consolidations: The Impact of Political 
Transaction Costs.” Public Choice 127: 75–95.  
Stigler, George. 1957. “The Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government.” In 
Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, ed. U.S. 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Washington, DC. 
Swianiewicz, P. 2010. “Territorial Fragmentation as a Problem, Consolidation as a 
Solution?” In Territorial Consolidation Reforms in Europe, ed. P. Swianiewicz, 
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative. Budapest: Open Society 
Institute. 
Tavares, A. F., and P. J. Camões. 2007. “Understanding Intergovernmental Cooperation 
in a Context of Devolution: An Empirical Study of Collaboration among 
Portuguese Municipalities.” Paper presented at the European Group of Public 
Administration Meeting, Madrid, September 19. 
Thurmaier, K. 2005. “Elements of Successful Interlocal Agreements: An Iowa Case 
Study.” Paper presented at the Creating Collaborative Communities Conference, 
Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, October 31–November 1. 
United States Government Accountability Office. 2008. “Federal User Fees: A Design 
Guide.” Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-08-386SP, Washington, DC. 
U.S. Agency for International Development/Perú ProDescentralización. 2010a. “Mapa de 
Politicas y Normas de la Descentralizacion.” Lima. 
———. 2010b. “Brújula de la Descentralización 2010–2011.” Lima. 
Vega, Jorge. 2008. “Análisis del Proceso de Descentralización Fiscal en el Perú.” 
Documento de Trabajo 266, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima. 
von Haldenwang, Christian. 2010. “Taxation, Fiscal Decentralization and Legitimacy: 
The Role of Semi-Autonomous Tax Agencies in Peru.” Development Policy 
Review 28 (6): 643–67. 
von Haldenwang, Christian, Elke Busing, Katharina Foldi, Tabea Goldboom, Ferdinand 
Jenrich, and Jens Pulkowski. 2009. Administración tributaria municipal en el 
contexto del proceso de descentralización en el Perú. Studies Deutsches Institut 
fur Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn. 
Warner, M. E. 2006. “Intermunicipal Cooperation in the US: A Regional Governance 
Solution?” Urban Public Economics Review (6): 221–40. 
Warner, M. E., and A. Hefetz. 2009. “Trends in Public and Contracted Government 
Services: 2002–2007.” Reason Foundation, http://reason.org/news/show/trends-
in-public-and-contracte. 
World Bank. 2010. “Peru: The Decentralization Process and Its Links with Public 
Expenditure Efficiency.” Report No. 52885-PE, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
 
 
 
